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THE LANDING OF THE ANZAC CORPS,

APRIL 25, 1915

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To those who were there, none of whom are now with us
I hereby declare that the work herein, now submitted as a thesis for the degree of Master by Research is the result of my own investigations and all references to ideas and work of other researchers have been specifically acknowledged. I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis has not already been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being currently submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Peter Damian Williams
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ABSTRACT

The task of the ANZAC Corps on the Gallipoli Peninsula was to draw upon itself the Ottoman reserve so the principal landing of the British at Cape Helles could proceed unmolested by this reserve. Thus the Corps senior officers decided upon a cautious approach - far from the full-blooded thrust it is generally thought to be. The Corps was deployed on the first reasonable defensive position ashore and spent the day repelling the anticipated counterattacks. This successful defensive battle, rather than the landing, should be regarded as the critical event of the day. It is not possible to make an amphibious landing designed to attract the enemy reserve unless one knows where that reserve is. This the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ did know, in considerable detail. As it happened the ANZAC Corps landed in the wrong place and this has been seen as the cause of its failure. But the error was not so great as to prevent the Corps fulfilling its task. It was rather that the Ottoman Reserve was a strong force, well supplied with artillery, which was primarily responsible for the disorder into which the Corps fell. An assessment of the combat effectiveness of the respective forces shows the ANZAC Corps to have suffered higher casualties than has thus far been thought and that the Ottoman Reserve was overall the superior of the two. Late in the day with the Ottoman Reserve becoming the attacker and the ANZAC Corps the defender this superiority proved to be not quite sufficient to overcome the natural advantages which in modern war accrue to the defender.
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The landing of the ANZAC Corps on the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915 failed because it was designed to fail. This is not to say it was designed to be defeated but rather that it was not expected that the force would advance across the peninsula as is generally imagined. Sir Ian Hamilton, who commanded the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force charged with seizing the peninsula, formulated a plan involving two main landings. The first on the tip of the peninsula at Cape Helles constituted the main attack. The second, that of the ANZACs at Ari Burnu, was to draw down upon itself the Ottoman general reserve so the main attack would not be interfered with. There the Corps fought a successful defensive battle against almost three quarters of all Ottoman forces committed on the day. Thus the ANZAC Corps fulfilled its role in the context of the overall plan and its landing should be regarded as a successful operation of war. It follows that the focus on 25 April should be upon the successful defence against the counter attack rather than on the failure of the Corps to advance to the far side of the peninsula - an advance which, as will be seen, none of the senior officers involved, with good reason, thought would actually eventuate.

What follows is an examination of the events of the day which backs up the proposition advanced here and draws the reader’s attention to other issues that have either not previously been properly understood or closely inspected. Not all of the controversies of the day are discussed. It should be assumed the writer takes no issue with the prevailing view in such cases. Four key areas are dealt with: the ANZAC plan; the landing; the battle; and the armies.

The first of these four themes to be discussed has already been mentioned. It concerns the plan and answers the question; what was the objective of the ANZAC Corps? The second concerns the landing controversy. It is often held that the confusion occasioned by the landing was the prime factor in the failure of the force to advance to its furthermost objectives.\(^1\) It will be contended here, however, that the disorder that did occur among the landed battalions was not as severe as is

\(^1\) For example see Watson, “The Gallipoli Blunder”.

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usually thought and was caused more by the preparatory bombardment and counter attack of the enemy later in the day than the events on the beach at first light. The third issue discusses the perception that the battle on second ridge in the course of the day “failed”. It was, as it was intended to be, a successful defensive fight. How successful it was can be assessed, at least in part, by an examination of the relative combat effectiveness of the contending forces and this constitutes the last of the themes with which this thesis is concerned.

Eighty-five years after the event, with more than one thousand books written on the Gallipoli campaign, there is still merit in re-examining aspects of the events of 25 April, 1915. In Australia, Charles Bean’s Official History has concentrated on the tactical level. Indeed the first volume contains the most detailed tactical account yet written. Some European historians, such as Aspinall-Oglander and Calwell, have concentrated on strategic issues. Narrative of the landings is not lacking, but analysis is. The operational aspects of the landing, that middle layer between the strategic and the tactical level, has not been so closely scrutinised as might be thought. Several new points can be made and some old ones seen in a new light.

This thesis will refer to the soldiers of the Ottoman Empire, made up of Turks, Egyptians, Syrians, Kurds, Arabs, Greeks, Bulgarians and troops of other nationalities, as Ottomans, not “Turks”. This distinction will also be used to distinguish between sources in Arabic script from the time of the Empire and those by modern Turkish authorities on the subject. A knowledge both of military terminology and some familiarity with the battle is assumed.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis has principally drawn on original documents, official histories, relevant historical analyses in article and book form, unpublished diaries, letters and personal correspondence. Ten years before he was given the command at Gallipoli, and with a wealth of active service behind him, Sir Ian Hamilton observed: “On the

2 Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol I
3 Aspinall Oglander, The Official History of the War, Military Operations, Gallipoli and Calwell, The Dardanelles
actual day of the battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the
following morning they have already begun to put on their uniforms". The weight
given to evidence in what follows has been guided by Hamilton’s statement. As a
consequence this thesis has sought the most immediate response of the participants
and generally given more weight to evidence the closer its source to the event. It is
also true that time permits the clarification of some details and relatively recent
Turkish sources have proved useful in this regard.

As a cautionary note it should be added that all cannot be known eighty-five years
after the event. There exist anomalies in the evidence the present writer is unable to
fathom. It might be true that, for all military historians, it is not always possible to
find the truth after so long. In some cases we can but suggest how things are most
likely to have been.

It is important to preface any discussion of sources with mention of the Dardanelles
Commission. In 1917, an inquiry into the campaign was begun. The initial inquiry
threatened to destroy numerous careers but the final report, of 1919, has more of the
character of an official history - no one is completely damned. Nevertheless the
Dardanelles Commission Report set the tone for the majority of the literature on this
subject – more in the nature of a witch hunt than a sober inquiry. A central theme
in English language literature was that the campaign was a failure and some one
must be held responsible. In the sense that he never again held a field command,
Ian Hamilton, the Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
shouldered that blame.

A sound starting point for research into the Gallipoli campaign is Hartevelt. F The
Dardanelles Campaign, 1915, Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. This
volume contains over seven hundred sources published in several languages. In so
far as the landing of the ANZAC Corps is concerned, the English language sources
fall into two periods. The first period encompasses the flurry of articles and books
that began before the campaign was concluded in December of 1915. The first

4 Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrapbook during the Russo-Japanese War, page V
5 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, 1919 PRO CAB 19
6 Hartevelt’s sources are mostly English language
period included the publication of the Australian Official History, the first volume on the landing appearing in 1921. This period was followed by a lull occasioned by the Second World War. The second post World War Two period has seen a reviving interest in Gallipoli, perhaps more recently conscious of the passing of the last of those who landed that day and as some new ideas and explanations have come to light.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE SOURCES-FIRST PHASE

The considerable literature immediately after the campaign focused on the landing itself, the consequent confusion and whether or not the landing was the main reason for the failure to advance to Mal Tepe - the ANZAC Corps objective as stated in the orders to the corps from the headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Immediately after the ANZAC landing, the issues that arose were dealt with first by Charles Bean in a series of articles in the Military Journal of July and October 1915. The discussion continued into the twenties and thirties mainly in military journals. The opinion of Gallipoli protagonists received an airing in 1927 and 1932 in the Army Quarterly. R. Leane there discusses the ramifications of orders given by Sinclair-Maclagan who was the commander of the first brigade to land at Ari Burnu, and wrote "Armarda Moves" which appeared in Reveille in 1932. This is particularly important because Sinclair-Maclagan is variously praised or blamed for his decision to halt the advance early in the morning of the first day. Among the last in a period of waning interest was Viney's contention as to why the landing failed in Reveille in 1937. He takes the position of Laertes and cries Maclagan is to blame. Viney argues it was Maclagan's decision to stop at Second Ridge that lost the battle. This point will be dealt with in depth later.

The first sizeable work on the Gallipoli operation, published in 1919, was Calwell's The Dardanelles. Calwell served on the staff of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and was a contributor to the plan adopted. His work contains a valuable discussion of the considerations relevant to the decision on where and how to land but suffers for a lack of access to Ottoman sources. Ten years later the volumes of

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the British Official History began to appear and four volumes, two for land and one each for sea and air operations, are of interest to us. The land battle is covered by Aspinall-Oglander (1932) who served in a similar capacity to Calwell. Like official history everywhere, criticisms of decisions and personalities are somewhat restrained. Aspinall-Oglander's work does however benefit from having had access to some Ottoman sources. The Gallipoli volumes of the British Official History might have been less kind in their apportion of blame, for Major General Ellison was originally commissioned to write the Official History but, for reasons unknown, there was a change of author after Ellison had commenced writing. Ellison's papers for these volumes, mostly in the form of handwritten notes, are available at the National Army Museum in London. It is apparent from reading the text that he had in mind a more critical work than that which was eventually sanctioned.

The very best published analytical work of the period is by Puleston of the Indianapolis Naval Academy. While Puleston concentrates on naval matters, his discussion of the land battle is more than useful in explaining the events of the day. Also in this period appeared a wave of Great War reminiscences and discussion from both the minor and major players. In Australia there were Howe, Rehkopf and Leane to name but three. In Britain Ian Hamilton's Gallipoli Diary is the most important of this ilk. His detractors say it suffers from considerable pre-publication reworking. In spite of these claims, Hamilton's diary remains a valuable, well written and surprisingly frank account. Birdwood's Khaki and Gown appeared much later and eschews controversy.

In 1941, Bean published Gallipoli Mission, an account of the visit to Gallipoli in 1919 of the Australian Historical Mission. George Lambert, who was along as official war artist, considered it still a wild enough place to go about armed and today enough of this remains to give a distinct feeling of isolation. Bean was able

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8 Ellison's papers are in the National Army Museum, 8704-35-330
9 Puleston's study is still used by the U.S.M.C.
10 Leane, "Landing at Gaba Tepe", Howe, "Sparks from an Old Controversy" and Rehkopf, "The Landing at Gallipoli"
11 Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary
12 Birdwood, Khaki and Gown
13 Bean, Gallipoli Mission
to interview a number of Turkish participants including Zekî Bey who was a battalion commander in the Ottoman 57th regiment - the one credited with first halting the ANZAC advance. *Gallipoli Mission* is an essential work for any serious student of Gallipoli history but its year of publication acted against it receiving the attention it deserved.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE SOURCES-SECOND PHASE

The revival of interest in the ANZAC campaign began in the sixties with the publication of three important works. Howe injected new life into the landing controversy by arguing in the April 1965 *Australian Army Journal* that Admiral Thursby, in charge of landing the force on the beach, changed the location at the last moment and that this, in combination with errors by those in charge of the tows, explains the unique features of the landing. Howe’s correspondence with Eric Bush on this point is available in the Imperial War Museum. The remaining two pieces are sizeable histories of the campaign - Alan Moorehead's *Gallipoli* and Robert James work with the same title. These works stimulated the interest of others and an intermittent series of books and articles, not perhaps as many as before the Second World War, is the result. Many of these concern themselves with aspects of the campaign not closely connected with our topic - the ANZAC Corps on the day of the landing. The most serious analysis in an article of this period is by C. Roberts "The Landing at ANZAC. A Reassessment". In part he looks again at Viney’s argument and supports him in claiming Sinclair Maclagan bears a measure of blame for the failure.

While working at the Australian War Memorial, Denis Winter published *April 25th, The Inevitable Tragedy* in which he examines, more than most other writers, some of the issues dealt with in what follows. The most recent general study of the campaign is by Steel and Hart. They provide many quotes from those present drawn from the Liddell Hart Archive in Leeds. Steel and Hart reassert Admiral

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14 IWM, Bush papers, 75/65, 1 and 2
15 Roberts, "The Landing at ANZAC, A Reassessment"
16 Winter, April 25th 1915, *The Inevitable Tragedy*
17 Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*
Thursby's oft-expressed view that the landing was not in fact far from the intended spot, though again this claim is contestable.

The most recent work on the campaign that has received considerable publicity is Doyle and Bennett's account in the Geographical Journal. Doyle and Bennett espouse many of the myths challenged in what follows. Their article, which concentrates on the influence of terrain on the campaign from the geographer's perspective at least has the merit of demonstrating that interest and controversy can still arise over 80 years after the event.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE SOURCES

Foreign language sources are primarily in Turkish, German and French. There are two excellent and detailed histories in Turkish, one by Belen and the Official History by the Turkish General Staff. The volume of this series concerning the Ottoman deployment before the landing was published as recently as 1993. There are also a large number of books published in that country, occasioned by the celebrations for the eightieth anniversary of their victory in the Dardanelles. Turkish work tends to focus on the naval aspects of the campaign and it is 18th March, the day of the defeat of the allied fleets main attempt to destroy the Dardanelles forts, which is celebrated in Turkey. There is also a volume of the German Official History that deals with their part in the campaign. Several thousand German soldiers were at this time serving in the Ottoman army and many wrote accounts of their experiences. The most important of these by far is Liman Von Sanders who commanded the 5th Army, charged with the defence of the peninsula. It is important here as Sanders explains why he deployed his forces as he did and what use he planned to make of the general reserve - that force committed against the ANZAC Corps on the first day. Hans Kannengieser's

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18 Doyle and Bennett, Military Geography: “The Influence of Terrain on the Outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign”
19 Genelkurmay Basimevi, Birinci Dunya Harbindi and Belen, Birinci Cihan Turk Harbinde
20 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, Die Operationen des Jahres 1915
21 Sanders, Five Years in Turkey
account is also useful for its description of the qualities of the Ottoman soldier 22. Of other German sources Poniatowski and Meullmann are the best 23.

The outstanding French account is by Commandant M. Larcher 24. This account is a general coverage of the Ottoman Empire's war with several good chapters on the Gallipoli campaign. The Commandant spent several years in Constantinople immediately after the war and made good use of original documents.

ARCHIVES

Larcher's work, derived as it is from original Ottoman documents is important as the present writer has been unable to obtain permission to view all relevant documents in Ankara and Istanbul. These documents are distributed between the Genelkermay Archive in Ankara and the Prime Ministers Archive in Istanbul. Any student of the topic should be aware it is an extremely difficult process to gain access to either of these institutions and all the documents are in Ottoman script. Further the photocopying of documents is not permitted. However, in the Public Record Office in London, The Liddel Hart Military Archive at Kings College, and in the Australian War Memorial Research Centre, many captured documents and maps are available. These institutions also contain numerous private letters of the personalities concerned and the last has an excellent collection of war diaries for all units from battalion to corps. These three locations are the most important for students of the Australian contribution to the Great War in general and Gallipoli in particular.

The Imperial War Museum also holds the collected papers of Eric Bush who made a lifetime study of the campaign as well as participating as a midshipman in the first wave of tows to land at Ari Burnu 25. In the Bush papers there is his correspondence with Howe concerning the landing error, a core source for this facet of the landing. The National Army Museum possesses the papers of Ellison who is

22 Kannengieser, Gallipoli Bedeutung und Verlauf der Kampfe
23 Meullman, Der Kampf um die Dardanellen and Das Deutsh n Tuerkische Waffenbundnis im Weltkrieg, Poniatowski: Der Zusammenbruch des Osmanis Reiches
24 Larcher, La Guerre Turque Dans La Guerre Mondiale
25 Bush Ibid, also see Dix unpublished account IWM box 96/20/1
referred to above. These last two institutions also have a good collection of secondary sources. The National Maritime Museum houses the collected papers of Admiral Thursby and the Royal Air Force Museum, at Duxford, has a collection of aerial photographs and associated documents and diaries of Royal Naval Air Service personnel who participated in the campaign.

In conclusion, there is an abundance of accounts of the campaign in general and the ANZAC landing in particular but much less analysis. What there is in English and particularly in Australia concerning the events at Ari Burnu often concentrates on the landing muddle and its effects upon the battle. As will be argued, this had less effect on the outcome of the battle on Second Ridge than is generally thought. The deployment and response of the Ottoman force was of greater importance in determining the course of the day’s events. German and Turkish sources support this view.

The four chapters that follow discuss the plan underpinning the ANZAC landing, the landing itself, the battle on second ridge and an assessment of the ANZAC and Ottoman contenders in broader brushstroke.

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26 Strain J, private papers, RAAF Museum.
CHAPTER TWO. THE PLAN
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BACKGROUND

The grand objective of the operations of the British and French on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915 was to bring about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire an ally of the main enemy Germany. It was first hoped this might be achieved if a strong fleet could overcome the Ottoman forts defending the Dardanelles and proceed to the capital Constantinople. A bombardment or even the threat of one, it was believed at the time, would likely bring the Turkish government undone. Alan Moorehead provides a useful summary of the peculiar circumstances:

"Turkey's position was very weak. Twice within the last five years Constantinople had been thrown into chaos by political revolution. It had the reputation of being a hysterical place, and it was known to be divided against itself. For the moment Enver and the Young Turks might have control but anything could happen with the appearance of an Allied fleet in the Golden Horn. One had to consider the condition of the crowded streets with their tumbledown wooden houses once the guns had begun to fire - or even at the threat of the guns firing. On past occasions the mob had run loose under far less provocation than this, and Turkish governments had been known to bolt very easily. There existed only two munitions factories in Turkey, and both of these were on the shore, where they could be quickly destroyed by naval gunfire along with such military objectives as the naval dockyards, the Galata Bridge and the Ministry of War. Constantinople was the centre of all Turkish affairs, economic, political, industrial as well as military...The fall of Constantinople was in effect the fall of the state..." 28.

A collapse of Ottoman resistance would lead to three consequences favourable to the allies. Foremost was to bring into the war on the Allied side Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece: Herbert Asquith thought the purpose was "a diversion designed to draw

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27 see Cole, Imperial Military Geography, pp 101-103 for a discussion of the general weakness of the Ottoman Empire
28 Moorehead, Gallipoli, p35
in the Balkan states"²⁹. Hunter-Weston, another commentator close to events believed the main objects of the operation were... "to impress the wavering neutral nations in the Balkans with the feeling that the Allies ... are certain to be victorious at an early date and that "rushing to the succour of the victor" they shall come in now on our side."³⁰

This was by no means a small consideration. Three years previously, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria had raised over half a million men with whom they deprived the Ottoman Empire of most of its European provinces in the First Balkan War. This force, if it could be persuaded to again enter the lists, was half the size of the entire Ottoman Army of 1915 and several times larger than the British and French force eventually landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Second Balkan War had finished only two years previous and the Balkans were still in a highly militarised state so a quick reaction could be anticipated should they decide to react at all.

Secondly, a supply route to aid the weakest of the Allies, Russia, would be opened up via the Black Sea. Grand Duke Nicholas, commander of the Russian Army, had requested in January of 1915 that the British and the French make at least a demonstration in the eastern Mediterranean to take some of the pressure off Russia. He had promised also to gather 40,000 men at the port of Odessa with a view to a landing at the northern end of the Bosphorus in concert with any amphibious operation of the British and the French from the south. This force was later dispersed to meet the needs of other fronts before the landings in April but its existence served the cause of the optimists on the staff of Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters.

Thirdly, the forces of Britain and Russia presently engaged with Ottoman troops on various fronts would, with a successful conclusion of war with the Ottomans, become available to fight the remaining members of the central powers - Germany and Austria Hungary.

²⁹ Hankey, The Supreme Command p282
This explanation for the utility of an operation in the Dardanelles was a controversial one at the time. In France and Britain two camps had arisen on the topic of grand strategy. The 'westerners' held that the correct move was to mass their main effort at or near the main supply base—Britain and France—to defeat the army of the main enemy Germany on the western front. The Dardanelles operation represented a triumph for the 'easterners', such as Kitchener who believed the trench deadlock that had developed in France and Belgium by December 1914 indicated the German Army could not be defeated in the west and the best course of action was to knock away the props of Germany - The Empires of Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans 31.

Beginning in February 1915, the fleet commenced operations. At this time:

"It was found quite easy to land a few marines at Cape Helles... now the whole place is, as you know, a network of wire and entrenchments, and it is almost doubtful if a division will be able to make a footing there" 32.

In a series of operations from February 19 to March 18, the combined British and French fleet failed to overcome the forts guarding the narrows 33. Their particular problem was this: access to the Bosphorus was denied the fleet by 109 guns in a series of forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles and extending to the Narrows near the ruins of the ancient city of Abydos. The heavy guns in these forts were supplemented by field artillery on a high steep sided Plateau, Kilid Bahr, on the European side. The Plateau overlooked the centrepiece of the defences, the fort at Seddel Bahr. The aim of the defenders was to prevent the advance of the Allied fleet by a combination of these defences as well as mines, searchlights and land based torpedoes 34.

The fleet could not manoeuvre in the confined strait so as to fire effectively at the forts without first clearing the minefields in its path. The minesweepers were sunk

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30 Hunter-Weston's Appreciation in Hamilton Papers, King's College, 17/7/30.
31 Letter quoted in Birdwood Khaki and Gown pp 249
32 Birdwood letter to Fitzgerald who was Kitchener's secretary, April 19th, PRO WO 30/57/61.
33 Denham, A Midshipman’s Diary pp 45-47 provides an account of a landing on March 4
by the guns in the forts when they tried to perform their function. Moreover, the
guns on the high plateau could not be seen by the fleet, nor was the flat trajectory of
naval guns suited to such a task. Aerial spotting of this fire was attempted but the
results were unsatisfactory as the guns on the plateau frequently shifted position. It
became apparent that a landing force was required to occupy this plateau, to drive
off the guns there and take the forts on the European shore from the rear. The guns
on the Asiatic shore would not by themselves be then able to stand up to the fleet.
This was just as well. In a directive, Kitchener had ruled out the Asiatic shore as a
possible landing place for other than a feint. His reasoning was that the plains
around Troy offered too wide a front for the forces available and any advance north
from there would leave its inland flank exposed. In contrast any landing on the
peninsula itself, owing to its narrowness, would facilitate protection of the flanks.

It is worth pointing out that this consideration of Kitchener’s was both sound and
recognition that the size of the force to be allocated for the Gallipoli operation,
78,000 men, was only adequate and no more, to the task. Armies who have a
significant numerical superiority over their enemy do not so much fear their flanks
being turned. On the contrary they desire broad plains where they may turn the
flanks of their enemy.

The War Council in London had foreseen in January of 1915 the fleet might be
unable to force the straits. It was decided in a series of meetings to send an
expeditionary force to assist the combined British and French fleet. The
precipitating event was the request from The Grand Duke Nicholas to take pressure
off the Russian army by at least a demonstration against the Ottoman forces.

In February 1915, the ANZAC Corps was chosen to form a part of the force
primarily because of its availability in Egypt. It was originally intended that the
Corps would go to England but, because of the lack of training facilities there, it
was decided to use the Corps to add to the defences of the Suez Canal, a vital artery

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34 See Puleston, The Dardanelles Expedition, a Condensed Study pp30-40 for a detailed description of the defences
35 Hamilton was quite happy with this reasoning and would have seen, like Kitchener, the dangers of
an overlong front on the Asiatic shore
36 Hankey, The Supreme Command p 284
in British Empire logistics. The Corps consisted of the First Australian Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division, 31,000 men in all. The Royal Naval Division, the British 29th Division and the French contribution of a Colonial Division brought the total for the force up to 78,000 men. Sir Ian Hamilton was given command. This was to be opposed by the Turkish Fifth Army of six divisions, about the same strength, under a German General Liman Von Sanders.

Hamilton arrived in time to conduct his first reconnaissance of the coastline of the Gallipoli Peninsula on the same day as the fleet made its last attempt to force the Dardanelles. Planning had begun before this and in less than six weeks his command affected a landing with the objective of assisting the navy to get through the Dardanelles to Constantinople.

The earliest appreciations of the staff at Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters considered a wide range of options (see map one) from landings north of Bulair to one on the Asiatic shore:

"There are five principal landing places from which operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula could be undertaken with a view to the opening of the Dardanelles: a) In the Gulf of Xeros (Bakla Bay); b) Suvla Bay and south of Nubresi Point; c) North of Kaba Tepe (to Fisherman's hut); d) South of Kaba Tepe; and e) Cape Helles and Morto Bay" 38.

By 25th March however the location of the landing had been narrowed down to somewhere near the tip of the peninsula. The thoughts of the commander of the force, Sir Ian Hamilton, in a letter to his superior Kitchener on April 10th are worth repeating at length:

"I am convinced the very essence of success must lie in upsetting the equilibrium of the Turk by the most rapid deployment of force possible over a fairly wide extent of country combined with feints where troops and launches cannot be spared for an actual serious landing. My main reliance will be on the 29th Division.......

37 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli p52
Australians meanwhile will make a strong feint which will, I hope, develop into a serious landing operation north of Gaba Tepe, and if they can maintain themselves there, I should hope later on they may be able to make a push forward for Koja Dere. Whatever this does, it will tend to raise anxieties in the minds of the men opposed to the 29th Division, and will prevent the plateau being reinforced” 39.

This quotation contains reference to many of the issues that concern this thesis. It establishes the nature of the ANZAC Corps landing is to be that of a feint and reveals there was a question of whether or not ‘they can maintain themselves there’. This refers to the Ottoman reserve, waiting behind the beach defences ready to counter attack. Hamilton goes on to say the ANZAC Corps landing will serve to prevent the Ottoman reserve interfering with the main landing by the 29th Division at the tip of the peninsula.

THE FIVE FACTORS

By 25th March considerable intelligence had already been gathered and the considerations which would determine where the landing could best be made had been incorporated into Mediterranean Expeditory Force staff planning. They are expressed concisely in an M.E.F. staff appreciation:

"The navy being unable to force the Dardanelles unaided, it becomes necessary for the army to cooperate on land; owing to the limited number of troops available it is essential that military operations be confined, in the first instance, to the Gallipoli Peninsula; in these circumstances the army can best assist the fleet by seizing the Kilid Bahr Plateau, thus taking the forts on the European side of the narrows in reverse; it must be accepted as certain that all possible landing places are strongly defended and that the Kilid Bahr Plateau is heavily entrenched; the most formidable landing place will be that at which most assistance can be obtained from the guns of the fleet. This will be at the south west extremity of the peninsula where the fleet can cover the landing and the eventual advance from both sides and from the rear...Owing however to the limited size of the available beaches, and to the

39 King’s College, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Hamilton papers 17/5/2
restricted front on which the advance can be made it is considered that the number of troops which can be employed in this area may be insufficient to attain the objective in view and that a simultaneous advance against the Kilid Bahr Plateau should be made by a force landed on the beach Kaba Tepe-Fisherman's Hut.\(^{40}\)

A close reading of this reveals the factors affecting where the landings should occur can be reduced to five:

- Proximity to the objective;
- Places suitable to land a force;
- Speed with which the troops could be landed;
- Places where naval gunfire support could be best used; and
- The location and strength of the enemy.

We will examine these mainly as they bear upon the ANZAC landing though some discussion of the overall plan is useful to show the place of the ANZAC landing within it. The aim here is to see how the factors determining the location of the landing relate to the way in which the landing is being characterised in this thesis, as a cautious diversionary move designed to draw down upon itself the Ottoman Reserve.

1. PROXIMITY TO THE OBJECTIVE

As a general rule an amphibious force should be landed as close as possible to the objective. The objective of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was the Kilid Bahr Plateau. It was here that the Ottoman field guns were deployed, preventing the minesweepers from performing their task. The main landing at the tip of the peninsula at Cape Helles constituted a direct assault on the objective. Because of the length of suitable beachfront available, it was not possible to land the entire force there within a reasonable time and a second landing place for the ANZAC corps had to be chosen. This landing site too should be as close as possible both to the first landing so as to be mutually supporting and should also be close to the

\(^{39}\) Letter to Fitzgerald, PRO WO 30/57/61

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objective. This dictated that the landing had to be on the peninsula not too far along the outer coast. However, as far as Gaba Tepe, the landing places were judged to be too well defended and beyond Suvla Bay the coast drops sharply in to the sea and becomes entirely unsuitable for an amphibious landing until the Bulair Isthmus.

If the objective of the ANZAC landing was to pin the Ottoman reserve so it could not intervene in the main landing then the Ari Burnu area is the best as far as the first criterion is concerned, as a short advance from there puts it in contact with this reserve located at Mal Tepe. Moreover such an advance threatens to cross the peninsula and cut the Ottoman supply routes to Kilid Bahr; the road running from Constantinople down the length of the peninsula and past the port of Maidos. The nature of a feint attack is that it must be sufficiently threatening to the interests of the enemy to force them to respond to it. A landing at Ari Burnu does this in two ways: it advances directly upon the Ottoman reserve thus denying it the ability to manoeuvre; and it threatens a vital geographical point – that containing the land and sea supply routes.

2. PLACES SUITABLE TO LAND

By 18th March the area within which the ANZAC Corps would be landed was then narrowed down to the outer coast of the peninsula between Gaba Tepe and Suvla Bay. This area is twelve kilometres long and may be divided into three parts: Brighton Beach; The Ari Burnu area including ANZAC Cove; and Suvla Bay.

The suitability of these three may be assessed in terms of beaches, defences and terrain.

At both Brighton Beach and Ari Burnu the coast slopes down to the sea with enough gradient to suggest a good depth of water close to the shore. Landing soldiers from boats in either place seemed then to offer no obstacle. At Suvla Bay

40 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Hamilton private papers 17/7/30, staff appreciation
41 First propounded by Sun Tzu, one of whose precepts was ‘seize what the enemy holds dear then he will be amenable to your will’. In the case in hand to cut the road down the peninsula and the port of Maidos, both in the Mal Tepe area, or to threaten to take them, would force an Ottoman response lest their force in the peninsula be cut from supply.
however there is a plain immediately inland and the Royal Navy suggested there might be reefs or sandbanks close offshore and there was not likely to be sufficient depth of water close inshore for the efficient operation of the many vessels involved. Moreover while Suvla Bay was the lightest defended locality yet another terrain feature rendered it useless. This was the Sari Bair ridge which arises from the sea at Ari Burnu and runs in a northeasterly direction. It is unclimbable to formed bodies of troops along most of its seaward side so a landing at Suvla would place this obstacle between the attackers and the defenders. This would allow the latter to delegate a relatively small force to hold the few practical ways over the ridge while the main body of the reserve would be free to act, presumably against the main landing. Alternatively if the Ottoman Reserve did throw itself against a landing at Suvla the diversionary nature of the landing would be well served but the force would likely be destroyed as it had little chance of reaching Sari Bair before the Ottoman Reserve, no useful defensive terrain and no prospect of getting sizable bodies of troops quickly up its seaward slope in any case. Something roughly similar did occur here in the August offensive. In short Suvla Bay was too far from the objective and too far from the main landing. Suvla Bay was then ruled out as a possible landing site at an early stage of the planning.

Two companies of infantry, four machine guns and two batteries of artillery defended Brighton Beach and Ari Burnu. The attackers were aware of the strength of the defence and felt this was a force they could cope with. The problem was this position was flanked by Gaba Tepe, a small headland jutting out to the south of Brighton Beach. This constituted the northernmost bastion of the defences along the outer coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here were another two batteries of artillery, two machine guns and two companies of infantry. Their fire could enfilade the transports and the beach as the troops landed.

Sir William Birdwood the commander of the ANZAC Corps was aware of this problem and had commented:

"If I find that the firing is too heavy on the ships off the beach...I shall move the whole landing further north up near the Fisherman's Hut, but the country just there
is so difficult and broken that it is impossible to attempt a landing there while it is dark." 42

This comment has given rise to suggestions that the landing place was in fact shifted north from Brighton Beach to Ari Burnu at the last minute. This issue will be addressed in the discussion of the landing.

A further consideration not mentioned by authorities on the subject is that the area just inland from Ari Burnu offers good defensive terrain if one expects an early counter attack. A position on Second or Third Ridge with its left resting on Sari Bair at about Chunuk Bair and its right holding Gaba Tepe is a good one from which to stand off the counterattack of the Ottoman Reserve. Possibly Suvla was not selected partly because the Ari Burnu-Brighton Beach area offered good defensive terrain and Suvla did not. Birdwood was aware of the defensive advantages of the ground. He wrote just prior to the landing: "I land as you know on the beach North of Kaba Tepe. The ground is very difficult, which is just what I like, as I hope that, broken as it is and covered with jungle, it will give my men all the cover they want..." 43.

3. SPEED WITH WHICH TROOPS COULD BE LANDED

A staff appreciation of 19th March addressed the question of how rapidly troops could be landed 44. With the limited beach frontage and boats available, it was thought a division could be landed in under two days at Cape Helles. With the assistance of the beaches at Gaba Tepe, another division could be landed in two or three days. In fact, troops were landed much faster than this on the day. The ANZAC Corps of two divisions, except for its artillery, landed in two days 45. As early as mid March, Cape Helles and just north of Gaba Tepe on Brighton Beach were considered the best locations for landing when all above factors were taken into consideration.

42 Kitchener papers, Birdwood to Fitzgerald 19/4/15 Public Record Office WO 30/57/61, written a week before the landing
43 Birdwood to Fitzgerald, 19th April, 1915 PRO 30/57/61
44 Hamilton Papers, Kings College 17/7/31
45 One of only two brigades instead of the usual three
The rate troops can be landed affects the celerity with which they can be brought to the decisive point on the battlefield. If the enemy can be there ‘firstest with the mostest’ they will be greatly advantaged. Had Hamilton used only one beach, he would have taken at least four days to land his five divisions. By this time, the Ottoman forces could oppose this with from four to six divisions and there would be no prospect of success advancing on the short Cape Helles front. Hamilton needed a longer front both to have more beach width to land and to use his numbers before the arrival of reinforcements evened the odds. He could do this by pinning the Ottoman reserve with a roughly equal force, allowing his main striking force, 29th Division, to advance against hopefully no more than a brigade.

4. PLACES WHERE NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT COULD BEST BE USED

The central reason the main landing point was chosen at Cape Helles was that Cape Helles was on the tip of a peninsula with the landing area sloping fairly gently in places up from the sea. There the maximum support of naval guns could be obtained from three sides. Further up the coast, where the Sari Bair massif drops into the sea, no such advantages can be obtained. At Gaba Tepe, there is a view inland from the sea for perhaps a kilometre but further north the rise of the land cuts off the possibility of direct observation. To a degree this could be overcome by aerial observation. Aircraft and a kite balloon on the SS Manica were available for this purpose. The consensus on both sides was that these forms of observation to assist naval gunfire were, in the main, ineffective. As far as this concerns our topic the point is that Ari Burnu was not chosen with the expectation naval gunfire support would be of great use. And so it proved.

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46 A saying generally attributed to Nathan Bedford Forrest
5. LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF ENEMY

The Fifth Army under a German General Liman von Sanders was charged with the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the mouth of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic shore. The army consisted of six divisions, approximately 80,000 men or about the same size force as Hamilton had with which to attack. Two divisions were stationed on the Asiatic shore, two in the southern peninsula and two to the north at the narrow neck of the peninsula at Bulair.

It is the two divisions in the southern peninsula who concern us so it is appropriate to give their fighting strength in some detail: The 9th and 19th Divisions had between them an establishment of 19 battalions of infantry, seven machine gun companies and at least 90 artillery pieces. Of these last, 38 were devoted to repelling a naval attack into the Dardanelles and were deployed accordingly to the south side of Kilid Bahr Plateau leaving 52 guns ranged against any landings on the outer coast.

This force was deployed, as described by Ellison, as if in a fortress. The plateau constituted the main defences with an outer line running up the coast from Cape Helles to Gaba Tepe. The position from Gaba Tepe to Suvla was weakly held primarily because the Sari Bair massif interposed a barrier between the landing place and the objective and thus was seen by the defenders as being an unlikely location for a landing.

The defenders had been at work for three months preparing trenches, registering the ranges of guns and improving roads. This was known by the attackers. Admiral De Robeck commanding the naval effort wrote:

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47 19,000 rifles including an attached battalion of Broussa Gendarmerie. See Turkish Official History by the General Staff Genelkurmay Basimevi, Birinci Dünya Harbini Türk Harbi Vnci Cilt, Cannakkale Cephesi, Vol II, Table One
48 Ellison’s papers in NAM 8704-35-326 give 20,000 infantry and 48 guns to 9th and 19th Divisions
49 Ibid NAM 8704-35-330
50 Ibid 8704-35-326
"The peninsula is rapidly being fortified and thousands of Turks work like beavers all night... each morning brings evidence of nocturnal activity. All landing places are now commanded by lines of trenches and are effectively ranged by field guns and howitzers." 51.

The two defending divisions had six regiments each of three battalions plus one attached battalion -nineteen battalions in all. Five battalions were spread out defending the beaches and the rest in five regimental concentrations were deployed in reserve to respond once it was clear where landings had been effected 52. Of these five regiments one was located half way between Ari Burnu and Cape Helles. It was on 25 April deployed against the Cape Helles front and it need no longer concern us here. The other four were located between Maidos and Boghali centred around Mal Tepe 53. This concentration was thus centrally placed to with ease respond to five possibilities: If a landing occurred at Bulair they could march north to there in a day. If a landing occurred at Suvla they could occupy the excellent position of Sari Bair before attackers from the sea could hope to cover the there five kilometres from the beaches. If at Ari Burnu they could march west in a few hours. If anywhere south towards Cape Helles they could be there in half a day’s march and if across the straits on the Asian shore they could be ferried across from the docks at Maidos 54.

This deployment had been made when General Liman von Sanders took over the Fifth Army more than a month before the landings. He wrote, “the position...had to be completely altered. (the troops) had been posted on different principles and distributed along the entire coast. The enemy would have found resistance everywhere but there were no reserves to check a strong and energetic advance.” As a consequence the force was redeployed and “labour battalions were at once set to work constructing direct communications between sectors” 55. Training included an

51 De Robeck to Hamilton, NAM 8704-35-33
52 By chance on the day of the landing one battalion was moving from coastal defence about Suvla while one was moving to replace it. Neither appear to have been in combat during the day
53 Three of these infantry regiments constituted the 19th division under the command of Mustafa Kemal and directly under the army commander as the army reserve, Bean, Gallipoli Mission p 133
54 Rhodes James, Gallipoli, p75.
55 Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, p61-62
emphasis on quick response by the reserve to a landing and night marches to the possible landing beaches became frequent occurrences.

Should this reserve be free to intervene where the main landing was to occur it would stop the advance in its tracks. The British 29th Division at Cape Helles would have been outnumbered by two to one. Should it be prevented from interfering then the attackers themselves could expect to have at least a two to one advantage at the decisive point-Cape Helles. This, it was hoped, would be sufficient.

Against the background of this explanation of factors paramount in the minds of the planners two new propositions will be argued. Both of these, to greater or lesser degree, run counter to the general trend of scholarship on the subject. The first is that the intelligence and maps available to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Staff were quite good. The second is that the plan for the ANZAC Corps landing, in its final form, was far from an injunction to push on inland regardless and was designed primarily to prevent the intervention of the Ottoman Reserve in the main landing.

**FIRST PROPOSITION-MAPS AND INTELLIGENCE**

The prevailing view, most recently repeated in an article by Doyle and Bennett was that: "During the planning stages, and in the initial landings, they (the MEF) had inadequate and poorly-surveyed maps, and little aerial reconnaissance. There was little or no direct knowledge of the terrain, there were no reconnaissance raids or other detailed observations"\(^{56}\). The evidence, however, indicates otherwise.

Popular history promotes the impression Hamilton and his subordinates were largely unaware of the dispositions of their enemy. This is completely false. Very good intelligence was provided by the intelligence department in Cairo and more particularly by aerial reconnaissance conducted by the Royal Naval Air Service from a base at Tenedos and the aircraft aboard the *HMS Ark Royal*. It is hard to see how this myth arose, for Charles Bean, the editor of the Australian Official History,
writer of several of its volumes and present throughout the campaign, held a contrary view.

"The presence of considerable Turkish forces...had been reported by Allied airmen and spies; Turkish camps, trenches and gun positions were accurately marked on the British intelligence maps." 57

Scrutiny of the documents issued by the MEFHQ reveals a month before the landing it was already known that:

"The enemy holds the Kilid Bahr Plateau in strength and is believed to have a number of troops concentrated in the neighbourhood of the Anafarta villages and Maidos. There may be two divisions (20,000 men) distributed in these areas" 58.

On 18 April Hamilton described the Ottoman positions to Kitchener as a "complete system of trenches and entanglements" and said 100 mobile guns and howitzers where available to the defenders 59.

This information was being continually refined and added to. A great effort had been made to map the Turkish position from the air. From 23rd March to April 24th, in addition to those flown from the _HMS Ark Royal_, 107 flights were flown by 3 squadron RNAS on Tenedos of which 42 were reconnaissance and 18 photographic missions 60. On 11 April, photographic reconnaissance missions began 61. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force War Diary records on 15 April "today the first photographs (as opposed to sketches) which have been taken in

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56 Doyle and Bennett, "Military Geography, The Influence of Terrain on the Outcome of the Gallipoli Campaign", 1915, pp12-36
57 Bean, _Two Men I Knew_, p 52. On 21 March 1915, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters was aware of a report from a spy called Talaat who was recently in the peninsula regarding a 4 gun battery on Mal Tepe -GHQ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force War Diary, PRO WO 95/4263
58 Australian War Memorial 4,roll 803
59 Ellison, NAM 8704-35-336
60 ibid 8704-35-330
61 King B, _Royal Naval Air Service 1914-18_, p38
aerial reconnaissance came in. Given fine weather, our information about ...all possible landing places should, in the next few days, be considerably amplified" 62.

The senior observer of 3rd Squadron went to Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters "where I had to go over the maps of Gallipoli and detail all I knew of the character of the country, the trench system and gun positions which we had discovered. General Birdwood impressed me particularly with the way he absorbed the details" 63. On 19 April, a balloon from SS Manica spotted the 27th Ottoman Regiment camp west of Maidos and by 20 April the picture of the defences was reasonably accurate and complete 64. The detail of the deployment of the defenders on the maps issued to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force officers and corrected constantly as new information became available, compares closely with Ottoman Army maps made at the time showing their deployment. Charles Samson, who commanded 3rd Squadron of the Royal Naval Air Service at Tenedos was of the opinion that "before the landing we provided a clear report of all that was there." 65. He also reported visits from Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff officers and field commanders a few days prior to the landing; "they had a careful look at our photographs and thoroughly discussed the part we were to play in the landing" 66.

Good maps using War Office originals and overlaying the above intelligence were produced by the survey department in British headquarters in Egypt and issued to officers down to company level. Maps made as a result of aerial reconnaissance, corrected to 23 April, show in two locations east of ANZAC Cove around Boghali "1270 tents" as well as tents for "six battalions" and "tents covering 1/4 square mile." This was the Ottoman Reserve, the 19th Division and part of the 9th Division. This information was relayed to the senior officers of ANZAC Corps: Bridges, commander of First Australian Division came away from a meeting with Admiral Thursby and wrote in his diary of being informed that "two divisions were near Bulair" and "7th and 9th Divisions north of Maidos, 58th Regiment near Achi

62 PRO CAB 19/32 no 141
63 Jock Strain was the senior observer of the Royal Naval Air Service Squadron based on the island of Tenedos, unpublished memoirs p55
64 Bush, Gallipoli p97
65 Samson, Flights and Fights, p228
66 ibid p231
Baba and one regiment between Bulair and Maidos" 67. Apart from the numbering of the divisions (it was the 19th and 9th near Maidos), this was accurate information 68.

Spies and diplomatic sources had also revealed surprising detail concerning the defences. A small example is the report from a spy called Talaat who had visited the peninsula and noted a four-gun battery deployed on Mal Tepe 69. Much of this intelligence came to Mediterranean Expeditionary Force via the British HQ in Cairo. As early as March 5th the intelligence summary from Cairo stated: “5th Army has been formed in Gallipoli under Liman von Sanders... [It] consists of 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th and 26th Divisions in the Gallipoli Peninsula and 11th and 12th Divisions on the Asiatic side” 70. This was roughly correct and within a month remarkably accurate information was available. By 23rd March the strength and location of 9th and 19th Divisions, the two Ottoman formations we are primarily concerned with, was established. The number of guns and infantry regiments was also known. Even the regimental numbers of the six infantry regiments of these two divisions were in the main correct 71.

The above evidence gives the lie to the opinion that the attackers were in ignorance of what they were up against. One only has to compare the maps issued to the ANZAC Corps to Ottoman maps of their own armies’ deployment to see how accurate were the former.

It is then not true to say the maps were inaccurate as far as enemy dispositions were concerned but it is also said they were inaccurate regarding terrain details. There are two counter arguments to this:

It is true that the detail of the deep twists and turns of the valleys immediately behind Ari Burnu are not sufficiently emphasised on these maps but otherwise they were accurate enough for the officers of the ANZAC Corps to identify their location

67 Bridges Diary Australian War Memorial 6673 2dr1 469
68 The maps discussed in this paragraph are in the Australian War Memorial map collection G7432
69 Australian War Memorial 4, ORMF 0088, roll 781
70 PRO WO 157/637
71 PRO WO 157/647
and objectives as soon as there was sufficient light to see on the morning of 25 April. Bean identifies only two map errors: The maps used do not show the severe nature of the Nek rather representing it as a narrower continuation of Russell’s Top 72. Secondly the existence of the Razor Edge is not shown. Rather it seems possible to advance along the top of a not too difficult ridge from Plugges to Bab Y 73.

Now this did have important consequences as will be enlarged upon later but it is simply not true to say the maps were generally inaccurate. It is more accurate to say there were some errors, which did influence the battle, but there were other factors, as will be seen, that had a greater bearing on the course of events.

Secondly the critics perhaps expect too much from military mapmaking. Until the 20th century most commanders would be pleasantly surprised to have somewhat accurate maps for any locations other than main routes in their own country and that of their ‘natural’ enemies. And in this century the situation has improved greatly only very recently. An example might serve to reinforce the point. To plan his reaction to an anticipated Japanese landing the Australian commander at Milne Bay in 1942, Major-General Cyril Clowes had only “a rough sketch which had been produced… by compass and pacing and had been dye-lined at Milne Force Headquarters” 74. Papua had been an Australian territory since 1919 yet there were no maps of military value of the Milne Bay area.

There was, however, one significant error made by reconnaissance reports which appeared on the maps issued. For a period of four days from 14 April to 17 April reports referred to a camp of 700 tents two kilometres to the south of Gaba Tepe. As Ottoman army tents had a capacity of 12 men, this suggests a force of over 8000 men or the major part of an Ottoman division 75. This camp did not exist. This piece of intelligence is of particular importance in the following discussion of why the ANZAC Corps halted on Second Ridge instead of pushing further inland and will re emerge in that location.

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72 Bean, Official History p 277 and 283
73 ibid
74 McCarthy, Australia in the War of 1939-45 vol 5, p166
75 Murphy, Soldiers of the Prophet, p 35
SECOND PROPOSITION-A CAUTIOUS DIVERSION

What is not generally understood about the task of the ANZAC Corps on 25 April 1915 is that it was one of strategic offence and tactical defence - the strongest form of warfare according to the Duke of Wellington. The strategic offensive consisted in the amphibious landing and the tactical defensive task was to take up a position in which the expected counter attack of the Turkish reserve could be absorbed. The ANZAC landing was a feint designed to draw down upon it the Ottoman Reserve so the main landing of the British at Cape Helles could advance unmolested by this reserve. Given the strength of the Ottoman reserve, there was every possibility the untried ANZAC Corps would be destroyed on the day of the landing. Moreover as the ANZAC Corps did engage the Ottoman reserve and stood off its attack the part of the Corps in the overall plan can be seen as a success.

The actual landing on the beaches, mainly because of the controversy attendant to it, has diverted attention from the battle on Second Ridge between the four brigades of the Corps and elements of two Ottoman Divisions present up to the time of the main counter attack in the late afternoon. A further consideration is the enemy do not always obligingly sit still and if the Ottoman reserve had moved immediately prior to the landing then it would have become the task of the ANZAC Corps to advance to the far side of the peninsula and it could have been rightly blamed had it failed.

Charles Bean in the Australian Official History stated "Every authority, from Sir Ian Hamilton down, had dinned into the troops you must go forward-you are the covering force. You must get on, whatever the opposition". It has been the general view that this emphasis on advancing applied to the whole but as is stated above it applied only to the covering force, the first of five brigades to land and applied only as far as Third Ridge where they were to halt. Nor is this view borne out in a reading of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force order to the ANZAC Corps, the Corps order to its two divisions, the divisions' orders to their brigades nor the brigade orders to the battalions.

76 Bean, Official History p256
A superficial reading of the order from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters might suggest the task of the Corps was to strike swiftly inland for Mal Tepe and thus cut off the Ottoman forces at the objective Kilid Bahr.

It begins: “The objective assigned to the A &NZ Army Corps is the ridge over which the Gallipoli-Maidos and Boghali-Koja Dere roads run, and especially Mal Tepe.”

The document in its entirety reads more cautiously than the opening statement might indicate. The orders for the ANZAC Corps take account of the Ottoman Reserve by ordering Birdwood to mass the First Division and await the beginning of the arrival of the NZ and Australian Division before attempting a further advance.

"By the time the second division begins to land sufficient troops should be available to admit of a further advance. Leaving the covering force to protect the northern flank of the landing place and line of communication, an effort will be made to storm Mal Tepe."

The point to be made here is that Hamilton intended that the Corps should engage the Ottoman Reserve so it could not intervene in the main operation of the 29th Division at Cape Helles. A glance at map three shows that, provided the Ottoman Reserve did not move in the night previous to the landing (they had not done so except to practise advancing to the coast, since Von Sanders ordered these dispositions four weeks earlier), a force landing north of Gaba Tepe and advancing in the direction of Mal Tepe could hardly expect to avoid the Ottoman Reserve. The hill of Mal Tepe was known to be in the midst of its encampment so it is hard to argue the Corps objective was not to engage and pin this Reserve. It seems obvious that the above warning to consolidate before advancing was given in expectation the Ottoman Reserve will not content itself with passivity but will likely launch itself at the ANZAC Corps. Indeed it could hardly do other for it would have been a

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77 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli, Appendix or PRO WO 95 4236
very hazardous manoeuvre for the Ottoman Reserve to have attempted to form columns of march to go to some other location when a force of equivalent size was already deployed in close proximity and advancing upon them.

The orders then direct a cautious advance in the direction of the Ottoman Reserve with intent to pin it so it is unable to intervene in the main attack. Hamilton appears to have intentionally landed the ANZAC Corps in a place designed to draw down this reserve upon it, giving the main thrust, the British landing at Cape Helles, a relatively free run to the objective at Kilid Bahr. While several writers have commented on the diversionary nature of the ANZAC landing, the effect this had on its planning and execution is not widely appreciated nor is its potentially sacrificial nature well understood.

The whole point of a strong diversion is this; if it is to be a useful diversion then the main effort will succeed even if the diversionary force is severely dealt with. Indeed, sometimes the more successful the diversion the greater the number of casualties it will sustain. Secondly, the size of the diversion must be reasonably great or the enemy will not for long be deceived. Thirdly, the size of the diversion in this case was partly forced upon Hamilton by the smaller than desirable size and number of suitable landing beaches in the area chosen for the main attack.

It will be noticed that the further down the chain of command one proceeds, the more cautious become the orders. The instructions from ANZAC Corps headquarters on 18 April to Sir William Bridges, General Officer Commanding 1st Australian Division stated:

"When this line (third ridge) has been secured you will be guided by the situation as to whether you make a further advance or consolidate your position until the landing of the bulk of the army corps permits the development of an advance towards its objective Mal Tepe. You should however watch your approaches from the south, from Eski Kesu, Koja Dere and Biyuk Anafarta and you may find it

\[\text{ibid}\]
possible to send detachments to the three places mentioned to turn the enemy out of
them." 79

Going down one command level the order received by Mc Cay for his 2nd Brigade
from his divisional commander (Bridges) makes no mention of an advance once its
objective on Sari Bair ridge had been taken. It states, "The position occupied by the
Brigade is to be held" and goes on to point out what defensive precautions will be
taken 80.

The character of the plan then, as it came down to the divisional commander who
was to execute it, was that there would be a rapid advance from the beach to the line
to be held by the covering force. This was to be followed by a period of
consolidation during which a counter attack could be expected then, perhaps, a
further advance.

Unofficial comments, both written and oral, made by the main players in the drama
support the proposition being advanced here. Birdwood in private correspondence
to Fitzgerald on 19 April wrote 81:

"I hope my advance may not be checked, and that we may be able to shove through
and gain the first ridge (actually what became known as Second Ridge), which is
about three quarters of a mile from the shore...I shall hope to secure the whole of
the hill and entrench myself, when I shall feel pretty secure of holding my own
against anything that can come against me and, if possible, I shall hope to shove on
in the direction of Mal Tepe...I may find this difficult, however, as Mal Tepe is
likely to be commanded by guns from all directions and I shall really not know in
which direction to expect attack, as they may come against me from Gallipoli,
Bulair, Maidos, or the Kilid Bahr Plateau...."I have great hopes of my being able to
effect my first landing in the dark without any great opposition, but I am afraid we
may come in for a baddish time of it when it gets light" 82.

79 PRO CAB 19/29 appendix III
80 Australian War Memorial 4 roll 803
81 Fitzgerald was Kitchener's secretary and Birdwood's friend
While the main point of this quotation is it provides clear support for the view that Birdwood understands the diversionary nature of his Corps orders and expects a strong counter attack he also makes reference in the same letter to the way in which the timing of the landing will divert attention from the main attack. "I am hoping that my early advance may detract a good deal of attention from him (Hunter-Weston's 29th Division at Cape Helles)".  

Hamilton's original intention was all landing should occur after dawn. Birdwood at Ari Burnu, however, insisted on a landing in darkness, which placed his troops ashore one and a half hours before those of Hunter-Weston's 29th Division at Cape Helles. This seems to have been successful for Liman Von Sanders says that information of the former landing arrived at his HQ an hour or so before that of the Cape Helles landing. Mustafa Kemal, commanding 19th Division states at the time he was informed of the attack at Ari Burnu he had heard of no other attacks so was all the more inclined to commit the reserve against it.  

Bridges, Commander in chief of 1st Australian Division, came away from the meeting on the HMS Queen Elizabeth to plan the landings on the night of 14 April and wrote in his diary the next day "the idea seemed to be we were to hold high ground above Fisherman's Hut". This defensively minded comment is the only writing in his diary concerning that meeting. 

On the same day Sinclair-Maclagan and other senior officers made a reconnaissance of the landing sites in HMS Queen. Sinclair-Maclagan commanded the covering force and was to command all forces ashore until Bridges assumed command. He examined the proposed landing area with field glasses and said "If we find the Turks holding these ridges in strength, I honestly don't think you'll ever see the 3rd Brigade again". As all present were aware the beaches were lightly defended, indeed that was one of the reasons the location was chosen, Sinclair-Maclagan was

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82 Birdwood to Fitzgerald PRO WO 30/57/61  
83 ibid  
84 Sanders, Five Years in Turkey p62  
85 Ataturk's Memoirs of the Anafartlar Battles IWM 314.16.K35413  
86 Bridges Diary Australian War Memorial 6673 2 469  
87 Coulhard Clark, A Heritage of Spirit, A Biography of Sir William Thursby Bridges, endnote 10, CH 12
presumably referring to the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements. Bridges told him not to be so pessimistic.

A final piece of evidence an early counter attack was anticipated comes from a map carried ashore and used by 3rd Brigade intelligence officer Captain Ross. On it are marked the locations of Ottoman forces together with calculations of the time the Ottoman Reserve would take to march from its camps to the position the covering force was to hold.

It may seem to the reader that taking into consideration what was known by the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force the whole plan was remarkably optimistic. But this is to forget that while there was evidence to hand that opposition might be formidable its quality was not surely known. For reasons relating both to the delicate political situation in Constantinople and to the Ottoman Army itself many were of Hamilton’s opinion; “it is always possible that opposition may suddenly crumple up.”

In summary then, the location of the ANZAC Corps landing was determined by proximity to its real objective— the Ottoman Reserve, suitable beaches and the difficulty of landing rapidly thereon and the relative weakness of immediate enemy defences about Ari Burnu. Intelligence on the enemy strength, location and intent was surprisingly good and this was communicated down at least to company officers together with suitable maps. The resulting plan was one which took full account of the likelihood that the Ottoman Reserve would place its whole weight behind an attempt to throw the diversionary force into the sea. Indeed this was the intent.

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88 Australian War Memorial map collection, G7432, G1S65, V2a. Ross certifies on the back of the map that this was the one he used
89 Hamilton to Robeck, Hamilton papers, King’s College 17/7/15-33
CHAPTER THREE. THE LANDING
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INTRODUCTION

This section seeks to establish two further propositions. Firstly, the landing, in all probability, did not occur where it was intended. This issue is the perennial one concerning the events of 25 April and must be addressed by any student of the landing though it is not the present writer's intent to go far into the mire for the second proposition is the more important to our main line of inquiry: Secondly the confusion occasioned by the landing was not the prime cause of the failure of the ANZAC Corps to advance as far as was hoped. The fragmentation of units caused by sending companies to the front line as soon as they landed in response to enemy pressure was of significantly more importance to the outcome of the day than failure to land in the right place.

THE LANDING DID NOT OCCUR WHERE INTENDED

"Why did the landing fail?" is the question addressed by most writers. The landing is, of course, of great relevance to the events of the 25 April 1915 as the landing determined the manner, direction and speed with which the covering force and the following brigades approached their objectives. In short, the landing established, at least initially, the pattern the battle was to follow without deserving quite the prominence in the day's events that it has attracted.

The idea that the ANZAC troops were landed in the wrong place holds a respectable place in Australian and New Zealand folklore. Explanations for the landing being in the wrong place run along three main themes: that the landing error was caused by the current as the tows approached the shore; an error of positioning by the marking battleship from which all others laid their course; and an error by the midshipmen steering the tows to the beach or some combination of the above. This idea that the landing did not occur where it was intended arose at the moment of the landing and was not seriously challenged until some years later by Howe who put forward the view that there was a last minute change to the orders which shifted
the site of the landing nearly two kilometres north; about where it occurred. Howe has since recanted but his controversial view has had the effect of stirring the pot and others have taken up the point in recent years. Was there, in fact, no landing error? Were the ANZACs to land at Anzac Cove as a result of a last minute change to orders or for some other reason?

A plan change scenario suggests that, at a meeting the night before the landing, Admiral Thursby, charged with effecting the landing of the Corps, and Birdwood the commander of the Corps decided to shift the landing site a little further north. They feared the effect of machine gun and artillery fire in enfilade of the beach from the strongly held Ottoman position at Gaba Tepe. Thursby and Birdwood were quite entitled to make this decision. Birdwood said Hamilton had given his subordinates "free hands in planning their own landings". Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had only instructed ANZAC Corps Headquarters to plan a landing "on the beach between Kaba Tepe and Fisherman's Hut". The distance between these two is six kilometres and the lack of precision could be taken to indicate wherever the Corps landed between these two points it was fulfilling its allotted task of advancing upon the Ottoman Reserve. It is true the original orders of 18 April were subject to amendments over the next week and during this time, new intelligence concerning enemy dispositions was still coming in. However, the Gaba Tepe position had long been known and it is more likely such a change in the planning because of Gaba Tepe would have occurred weeks earlier.

There is a comment by Birdwood used above in another context that, at first sight seems as if it will support Howe:

"I land, as you know, on the beach north of Kaba Tepe. The ground is very difficult, which is just what I like, as I hope that, broken as it is and covered with jungle, it will give my men all the cover we want."
Rough going is also good defensive terrain if one expects a counterattack. The good ground to the south was better defended and one could argue Birdwood reasoned with an inexperienced force it was of prime importance to get ashore at the least defended location and where a good defensive position in the form of second or third ridge could be found.

Where exactly is Birdwood talking about? This quote cannot serve as a description of anywhere north of Ari Burnu nor can it be south of Gaba Tepe. If we divide the remaining ground, some two kilometres in length, into two parts, it must refer to Brighton Beach or the actual landing site in ANZAC Cove.

The weight of evidence supports the view it was in fact the intended, not the actual, landing site Birdwood meant. Birdwood, his two divisional commanders, several of the brigade commanders and many of the unit war diaries mention the error very soon after the event. Birdwood is clearest. During the night following the landing Bean spoke with Birdwood:

"On the way down the beach I met General Birdwood...Birdwood told me "First there was the mistake of landing us a mile and a half north of where we should have landed in this ghastly country" 95.

...Godley is typical of many others and explained in a letter to a government official in New Zealand twelve days after the landing: "You will have heard, no doubt, that our particular landing on this side was made about a mile and a half further north than was intended, as, in the darkness, the picket boats mistook another point for Gaba Tepe..." 96.

And a week prior to the landing Birdwood had written:

"If I find that the firing (from Gaba Tepe) is too heavy on the ships off the beach...I shall move the whole landing further north up near the Fisherman’s Hut, but the

95 Bean, Gallipoli Diary p75
96 Godley to Wigram CAB 19/29/52
country just there is so very difficult and broken that it is impossible to attempt a landing there while it is still dark. 97

As Fisherman’s Hut is just a kilometre and a half north of Ari Burnu and the ‘difficult and broken’ country he refers to extends down to Ari Burnu and Birdwood did make his landing in the dark it seems clear from this and the above evidence that he did not intend a landing at Ari Burnu.

Admiral Thursby also makes no mention of any last minute change of plan. On the contrary he wrote the landing did in fact occur roughly where intended. From some days after the event to the end of his life, Thursby maintained this 98. Though Thursby has been accused of “deliberate lying misrepresentation” this assertion has received new impetus from Steel and Hart who point out that there is a difference of 240 yards between a nautical mile and a land mile and if Thursby was using the former and the army the latter then the difference between the intended and actual landing location is not so very different 99. This is an interesting idea but, at best, serves only to explain the Admiral’s own view that the landing was roughly in the intended place rather than what occurred.

Also unresolved is Howe’s point concerning the destroyer tows. These tows constituted the second wave landing in daylight, a half-hour after the first wave. They too landed two kilometres or so north of the point proposed.

It will be remembered that the covering force, the 3rd Australian Brigade, was to be landed in two waves. Howe’s point is that while confusion occasioned by darkness may explain the first wave going astray, it does not serve for the second wave who landed in daylight a similar distance north assuming of course Bean’s map is accurate. This, Howe argues, indicates that a change of plan was made at the last minute to land further north.

97 PRO WO 30/57/61
98 NMM Thursby, Dardanelles Box. See also Thursby’s account in Reveille: “Power of the Navy, Landing Made Possible”
99 See Steele and Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli appendix I and for the attack on Thursby see Watson, The Gallipoli Blunder p 182
"If the troops did in fact land a mile too far north, it stretches the long arm of coincidence altogether to suggest that the destroyers did the same thing. This map [in Bean's Official History showing exactly where the first and second wave tows actually landed] indicates very strongly that they landed their men [in daylight] in their correct place in relation to the rest of the troops" 100.

Here Howe is on stronger grounds. It seems very unlikely exactly the same error of distance would be made by the destroyer tows in daylight as was made in darkness half an hour before, particularly as the commander of the covering force was present and has since made no illuminating comment other than to follow the general opinion that the landing place was in error.

While Howe's point about the destroyer wave is intriguing and suggests there might be more to be learned on this topic, on balance Howe's plan change scenario must be rejected at the present time. There is no documentary evidence to support it. It seems almost inconceivable that Thursby could have made such a change without others concerned ever learning of it. Similarly hard to credit is the scenario that, had a last minute meeting occurred, neither Thursby nor Birdwood nor his principal subordinates Bridges and Godley, would ever after refer to it even when called upon to give an account at the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry. On the contrary the opinion of all those present and in a position to know is that no such change of plan occurred.

We are left then with the original explanation that there was an error. If there was a mistake in the landing place why did it occur? It seems the answer lies at sea: We are left with three options, an error of navigation on the part of the Royal Navy in the positioning of the battleship from which all where to take their bearings, an error on the part of the midshipmen charged with getting the tows to the beach or the effect of an offshore current alone or on in combination with one or both of the above.

100 Bush papers, IWM 75/65
It should be emphasised that even on a calm sea with little wind such as there was that night navigation at sea was not a precise art. *HMS Triumph* the marker ship was sent ahead and anchored at a nominated point five miles off Gaba Tepe\(^\text{101}\). If an error of a hundred metres was made there this could easily result in an error of a thousand metres on shore and yet is, in itself, as accurate a piece of navigation as could be expected under the circumstances. Similarly it was impossible to take precise account of the current that is held to have pushed the landing north. Currents can run in different directions depending how far offshore one is. So to say an inshore current pushed the landing north may only be part of the story for it is equally likely another current or currents acted on the ships and the tows in the five kilometres between the marking ship and the point where the tows went ahead alone.

Having established the weight of evidence indicates there was a genuine landing error and that this should not be as surprising as the difficulties of the operation have generally been underestimated we will leave this issue and proceed to the argument that this error was not the prime cause of the disorganization into which the ANZAC Corps fell and which many believe was the cause of their ‘failure’.

**OVERATTRIBUTION OF EVENTS TO THE LANDING**

A good example of the traditional view that the landing error was responsible for the failure of the Corps appeared in an article in 1982 recording an interview of Colonel S Watson who participated in the campaign; “...had the ANZAC force been landed on this elected battle area [Brighton Beach], it would have resulted without doubt, in the ANZAC troops reaching their objective, the village of Maidos by sunset....”\(^\text{102}\). It is the purpose here to argue that this view is in error.

A glance at map three will confirm an error of two kilometres more or less in the location of the landing still finds the ANZAC Corps advancing in the direction of the Ottoman reserve. As the objective of the Corps was to engage and pin down that reserve so it could not intervene in the main attack at Cape Helles then in does not

\(^{101}\) Corbett, *Naval Operations* Vol II, ch 17

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matter so very much if the landing took place short a distance further north than intended. Of course it does matter if the landing error caused such confusion in the Corps that it became a distinctly less efficient fighting machine for then it would likely be destroyed by a counterattack and cease to serve as a pinning force.

Let us then first try to assess the disorganisation of the first wave then pass on to that of the whole corps.

Not too much should be made of the confusion bought about by the landing. Writers on this subject tend to exaggerate its influence on the outcome of the first days fighting. It must be remembered that 16,000 men landed about Ari Burnu on 25 April. Only the first two waves of 4000 men was disorganised to a great degree by the landing itself. The first wave of 1500 was completely disorganised. Those who landed from the destroyers, the second part of the covering force in the second wave, some 2500 men, landed in their correct relationship to one another and on the broad front it had been intended the first wave would have. So while time was lost reorganising all 8 companies of the 9th and 10th Battalions a full half of the covering force did eventually get to their objective at 400 Plateau. Of these the 10th was according to Bean ‘more or less complete’. The 11th and 12th Battalions were quite disorganised, many operating in parties of platoon size under any officer present.

As the two passably organised battalions were both on the right flank it is clear the left flank was the less strong of the two and this had consequences later in the day when the Ottoman main counter attack pressed this part of the front line.

Following the 3rd Brigade and timed to land throughout the day were the remaining four infantry brigades (16 battalions) of the ANZAC Corps. Most of the artillery and the non-combat elements of the Corps were to land the following day. The intent was the infantry would land by companies and when a battalion had been

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102 Watson, “The Gallipoli Blunder”, p 178
103 Winter in April 25th The Inevitable Tragedy, p 160, appears to overstate the disorganisation and characterises this move as “a mass of 9th and 10th battalion men chased [Ottoman forces] down into the depths of Shrapnel Gully”
104 Bean, Official History p 350
assembled it could be committed to the fight or held in reserve as seemed best at the time. The three brigades that landed after the covering force and before midnight (elements amounting to almost one brigade of infantry failed to land on the first day) did arrive in an organised manner and, were companies permitted to form battalions and battalions go into the line with their own brigade, an organised line would presumably have been the result. Yet, when we examine the battle line at the end of the day we see in the main parts of battalions, usually in company size groups or smaller, scattered along the front. What had happened?

The answer is they were up against a strong, well-led and aggressive enemy who threatened to break their line throughout the day with a combination of artillery bombardment and counter attacks. This threat forced the ANZAC Commanders, first Sinclair-MacLagan then Bridges to commit the companies of infantry to the battle immediately they landed. As a consequence most companies became separated from their battalions. That the landing process was greatly interfered with by the enemy and that this was the prime cause of the disorder is the point the following discussion is intended to clarify.

The situation at about ten o’clock is summarized by Aspinall-Oglander: “For Major General Bridges the situation was an anxious one…. Both brigades had become disintegrated. Since General Bridge’s arrival on shore, 8 of the 16 companies of 1st Brigade, which he had hoped to keep intact as divisional reserve, had already been rushed into the fight on second ridge. Of the remaining eight companies, six had not yet landed, and only two were available on shore to meet any further urgent calls for reinforcements. (Then), the divisional commander was to learn that his left flank…was after all in imminent peril. Orders were at once issued for the two available companies to reinforce the Nek and with their departure…all the (available) infantry of the division had been absorbed into the battle. Little progress had been made, only half of the covering forces task had been accomplished; the position was manifestly insecure; and the inevitable counter attack had hardly yet begun” 105.

105 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations Gallipoli p 188
General Godley described it thus;

"Each new lot of troops as they landed had to be pushed off up the hills to where most urgently needed and consequently brigades and regiments soon [became] hopelessly broken up" 106.

And speaking then of his own division which began landing from late morning he wrote:

"As the men from each ship came ashore they had to be hustled off to reinforce any point where the resistance was hottest, irrespective entirely of what unit they belonged to, with the result that platoons and companies, Australians and New Zealanders, all got hopelessly mixed up" 107.

The above evidence indicates that it was the pressure applied by the enemy, not any confusion over landing locations that, throughout the day, caused the entire corps to become disorganised. The nature of this pressure will be discussed at greater length in the chapters discussing the battle and the armies.

A final point is that most observers concluded that, whatever the reason for the landing on a short front around the point of Ari Burnu it was fortuitous, for a landing further south, at Brighton Beach, would have exposed the early waves to much greater casualties and disorganisation from fire from Gaba Tepe than otherwise occurred. It can be inferred that they believed the disorganisation of the landing of the initial wave was outweighed by the lesser number of casualties inflicted.

Godley’s opinion is typical;” It was, I believe, a providential mistake as, judging from our later experience, I believe that our casualties would have been enormous on the more open beach” 108.

106 Australian War Memorial 3drl 1731, 419/10/7 no 2 of 50 docs
107 CAB 19/29/52
108 ibid
To summarize the ANZAC Corps was not as badly affected by the peculiar circumstances of its disembarkation as is generally thought. It was rather the pressure applied by the enemy, forcing the commitment of almost every company as soon as it arrived, that was responsible for this disorganisation. Ottoman artillery made an important contribution to this by disrupting and slowing the landing schedule which served to compound the problem. This will be discussed later. It is now appropriate to turn to an examination of the battle on second ridge.
CHAPTER FOUR. THE BATTLE
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INTRODUCTION

The importance of a discussion of the battle on Second Ridge is to place emphasis where it has not often been placed before. While Bean and others give plenty of detail on the events of the day there has been little analysis of the fighting from an operational perspective. The three phases of the battle can most conveniently be described as the manoeuvre for position that ended when second ridge was secured by the ANZAC Corps having halted the first Ottoman counterattack, the preparatory phase of the main Ottoman counterattack consisting mainly in their artillery bombardment of Second Ridge and, thirdly the main counterattack itself.

FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE-MANOEUVRE FOR POSITION 0430 to 0900

In general terms, the 3rd Brigade (9th, 10th, 11th and 12th infantry battalions) on landing, moved through Plugges Plateau and some advanced to Baby 700. The majority, however, made for 400 Plateau through Shrapnel Gully. The covering force was in two waves; the first of 1500 and the second of 2500. This second wave landed from ten to thirty minutes after the first and in some cases those in the southern half of the line, south of Hell Spit, owing to easier terrain and a more direct route, got to Second Ridge about the same time as those in the first wave.

While legend has it that the first wave hared off inland in small groups in accordance with their orders to push on at all cost this is not, in fact, quite what happened. It is true that the troops had been told of the importance of pushing inland. It is also true the scouts of each battalion, in platoon strength, had exactly this task and some other small bodies of men followed them. It will never be known exactly how many men we are talking about as most of them were killed on third ridge but it may have been about ten per cent of the 3600 rifles in 3rd brigade.

109 Roberts and Winter are two who do address operational aspects.
Between 0430 and 0730 the rest of 3rd Brigade staked out the position the Corps were to hold, with one important variation (the loss of the Baby 700 feature), until the August offensive. This is the phase referred to as the manoeuvre for position and it is worth looking at in some detail in order to understand why no further advance was made. This is the central issue of the first phase. It is usually argued, most prominently by Viney and Roberts, that the decision to halt on Second Ridge made by Sinclair-Maclagan, was an error.

All 36 boats in the first wave landed clustered around Ari Burnu on a short front of 700 metres, about 20m a boat, so close at least in one case that three boats were interlocked so only the outermost oarsmen could row. At that stage they were under fire only from an Ottoman post on the knoll of Ari Burnu and from a machine gun at Fisherman's Hut. To the immediate front of 3rd Brigades landing there were squad and platoon sized elements of two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the Ottoman 27th Regiment and one artillery battery on 400 Plateau. These provided little opposition and were soon captured or forced to retire.

Only the outermost two of the six companies in the first wave landing passed to either side of Plugges Plateau. The other four, less the scouts and others who had advanced impetuously, were reorganised on or near Plugges, constituting at least half of the 1500 who landed first. These were soon joined by three companies of the second wave, giving a force of perhaps 1500 men under command, mainly 10th and 11th Battalions though it should be said they were not all on the top of Plugges at precisely the same time. The pause was part of the plan, to wait for second wave companies at Plugges. There these troops were reorganised by Major Brockman. Constant pauses for reorganisation were a feature of the plan that had been stressed in training in Egypt. This pause must have been at least half an hour as D Company of 10th Battalion for example, arrived that length of time after the other companies of the battalion.

Allowing a half hour from the landing for this force to gather on Plugges and another 45 minutes for part of the second wave to join them and the reorganisation

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110 See Bean, *Official History* p281 for strengths of units landed
to be accomplished, it cannot have been before 5.45am that they set off for 400 Plateau, their objective, one kilometre away and easily discernible by this time. Their course took them over rough ground down into Shrapnel Gully and up over the seaward side of 400 Plateau. It is likely they arrived and deployed by 0700 or a bit later. There Sinclair Maclagan, at about 0730, instructed there should be no further advance at the moment and that the 2nd Brigade which was to arrive after the covering force and advance on its left up the Sari Bair ridge should instead deploy to the right of the covering force. Prior to a discussion of this decision there are two topics to be covered. First a review of the general situation at this time is appropriate and second there is the issue of at what time the Ottoman Reserve responded to the landing.

At 0700 all the covering force and most of the 2nd Brigade were ashore, in all 7000 rifles. The 2nd Brigade was assembling near the beach and only the covering force was holding the line. This was, incidentally the only time in the day when anything approaching a full brigade was able to be held assembled, uncommitted and in reserve. If we deduct ten percent for those who had pressed inland in small parties and the scouting platoon of each battalion and a further ten percent for casualties there were at this time 3000 rifles (excluding 2nd Brigade) on a front of 2500 metres - a very thinly held line.\textsuperscript{112}

Half of this force was on and to the right of 400 Plateau-1500 rifles reasonably well concentrated and organised on a front of 700 metres. (See maps two and three) Several parties had first occupied 400 Plateau the strongest of which was two companies of the 9th from the second wave who had come directly inland from the northern end of Brighton Beach having landed there around 0445 or 0500.\textsuperscript{113} They probably arrived on the Plateau at 0600 or earlier. Whenever they did arrive, it was quick enough to prevent the Ottoman batteries there opening fire at all.\textsuperscript{114} There

\textsuperscript{111} ibid p 262

\textsuperscript{112} The ten percent casualty figure for this period is drawn from estimates made at the time. The ten percent for those advancing is more difficult to calculate but is likely to have been no more, perhaps less than this figure. Only 5 per cent, one platoon of scouts for each battalion of the 3rd Brigade, were actually given the task of advancing beyond the line 3rd brigade was to hold.

\textsuperscript{113} Bean, Official History p338

\textsuperscript{114} Bean p338. The Turkish Official History says these guns were in the act of moving forward to the seaward edge of 400 Plateau when surprised by Australian infantry, Turkish Official History Vol II p 111
was then an engagement with the personnel of the Ottoman battery, a platoon protecting it and machine guns during which most of the Plateau was occupied. There was then another pause for reorganisation. At this time, the elements of 9th and 10th Battalions from Plugges began to arrive and the order was given by Sinclair-Maclagan to advance no further.

The other half of the front line, less well organised, was holding 1800 metres to the left of 400 Plateau along Second Ridge to Battleship Hill thence down to the beach south of Fisherman’s Hut with 1500 rifles. They were mainly concentrated in four bodies. On the extreme left 200 men faced the enemy holding Fisherman’s Hut. Two bodies were on the Sari Bair range – probably 200 men were about Baby 700 and Battleship Hill including the parties of Lieutenants Tulloch, Margetts, Kindon and Lalor. Another 400 men, half of the 12th battalion, were behind these, in reserve on the Nek and Russell’s Top. The fourth body was the main part of 11th Battalion whose rendezvous point was Battleship Hill. It was about 0700 when they left Plugges for this point. Half the battalion was now directed by Sinclair-Maclagan to fill in the gap in the centre between the concentrations on the left around Baby 700 and the right on 400 Plateau. These formed a thin line along second ridge linking these two locations and a third company, with a composite company made up from all battalions, was to reinforce Baby 700 and push on up that ridge to the original rendezvous point. However, some men were retained on the central ridge and some got lost in the upper reaches of Monash Gully. In the end, perhaps 100 men reinforced Baby 700, which by 0800 held elements of all ANZAC battalions thus far landed.

The first organised bodies to reach the Nek had all landed to the north of Ari Burnu and had had to climb the cliffs near the Sphinx and Russell’s Top. There was a pause on the beach and another before they charged an Ottoman trench on Russell’s Top and then advanced to the Nek, where they halted temporarily at about 0700. The total distance covered, about two kilometres in over two hours, was a creditable effort given the precipitous nature of the initial climb from the beach north of the point of Ari Burnu to Russell’s Top. Today it is difficult to see how it can have been

115 Bean, Official History, ch XIII
done at all. Tulloch himself had fifty men and was soon reinforced with thirty 117. With the exception of Tulloch's final successful effort to gain the far side of Battleship Hill, perhaps as late as 0900 but probably earlier the advance was brought to a halt not to be resumed118.

At this time, 7.30am, only four bodies of enemy were in close contact with 3rd Brigade. A platoon and one or two machine guns were keeping heads down at the northern end of the line by firing from Fisherman's Hut and artillery and machine guns were performing a similar service on the southern or right flank of the ANZACs from Gaba Tepe but these two groups need not concern us at the moment. Of greater interest are the main bodies of two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment. One of these had originally been camped in the upper reaches of Shrapnel Gully with section and platoon posts holding the beaches in the landing area. It appears the landing was sufficiently surprising that the main body of this company had no time to move into its trenches overlooking the beaches. Instead it retreated along Sari Bair ridge. From Russell's Top via the Nek to Baby 700 and Battleship Hill it fought a delaying action. It was this force of possibly 150 men who were able to slow and eventually halt the movement of the various ANZAC parties (about 200 men) who had initially headed in this direction.

The second of these two companies was originally deployed in reserve behind Gaba Tepe but was very early in the proceedings redeployed along Third Ridge towards its southern end with 400 Plateau to the north west of its new position 119. These are the troops referred to by Weir, of 10th Battalion on 400 Plateau:

"We were in position about 6.30. At about 6.30 to 7 we could see [enemy] troops on [the] far ridge" 120.

Exactly who fought whom is not easy to establish; Roberts has said “…reactions to the ANZAC landing are not well documented… there is no evidence of the

116 ibid p286
117 ibid p 290
118 ibid p289
119 See maps at end of Vol II, Turkish Official History
120 Bean notes and diaries Australian War Memorial 38
movements of the reserve company of the 2/27th, [the company referred to immediately above] but one must assume that it deployed against the ANZAC landing although the timing and location of its initial contact with the 3rd Brigade is not known\textsuperscript{121}. This may be true as far as English Language sources go. The above interpretation is however derived from Turkish sources\textsuperscript{122}.

It is generally held that until Tulloch's advance was finally halted on Battleship Hill at no stage in the first four hours was enemy activity responsible for much delay\textsuperscript{123}. This, it will be argued is not true. The central factor concerns the timing of the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements and it is to this we will now turn.

**TIMING**

An issue of considerable controversy regarding the movements of Ottoman and ANZAC troops was the timing of the events of the 25 April 1915. Critical to the consequences of the timing factor is the justification of Sinclair Maclagan's decision to halt the advance on Second Ridge. The evidence suggests that the Turkish response was swifter than previous authorities have thought. Was the time the Ottoman Army was using the same as the British Army? This is a knot of Gordian proportions and no definite conclusion can be reached here other than to say it seems very likely there was no significant gap between the halting of the ANZAC Corps on Second Ridge and the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements. Even if there was a gap of time, it will be argued that Maclagan's decision to halt on Second Ridge was still the correct one.

There was no one standard approach to timekeeping in the Ottoman Empire in general or the army in particular\textsuperscript{124}. In some cases the approach taken was that 0300 would be three hours after first light and 0400 would be four hours after first light and so on. This is clearly not the system utilised by the formations of the Ottoman Fifth Army at Gallipoli. The German officers in that army complained

\textsuperscript{121} Roberts, "The Landing at ANZAC, A Reassessment" p.32  
\textsuperscript{122} Turkish Official History Vol II pp 92-110  
\textsuperscript{123} Tulloch thought there were about 60 of them Bean, Official History p288  
\textsuperscript{124} Personal correspondence with Bilunt Yilmazer, Birten Celik, Secil Akgun, Robert Zeidner, Thomas Scheben and Tim Travers.
bitterly and often but were unable to effect a change. There is for example a one-hour time difference in the accounts of officers at 5th Army headquarters in Gallipoli town as to when word first arrived of the landings. Kaizim Pasha, the Chief of Staff of the Army wrote soon after the event that he received news of the landing at 0600 whereas his immediate superior the German Commander, Liman Von Sanders, says it was 0500. Similarly two accounts from officers present at 19th Division headquarters cite different times as to when word first arrived from 26th Regiment to report a landing in the Ari Burnu area.

It should not be thought the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was without fault in this regard. At that time, synchronising watches was not a standard operational procedure. A simple example will serve to illustrate this. The time of the first waves’ arrival at the beach is generally accepted to be 0430 and this seems about right. However when one consults the war diaries and ships logs of the attackers present the time is variously given as anything from 0400 to 0510. This is all the more remarkable in that the defenders opened fire immediately prior to the first man stepping ashore and this was heard by all in the vicinity, in boats approaching the beach and in ships off shore. Nevertheless it is at least true to say the times given by ANZAC Corps or Royal Navy observers are in general more reliable than those given by Ottoman Army sources.

The key question is when did Ottoman reinforcements arrive? If officers of the ANZAC Corps, Sinclair-Maclagan particularly, could see large Ottoman forces concentrating against them at an early stage then the decision to halt makes eminent sense. The two reinforcing units that concern us were the 19th Division with three regiments (over 7000 rifles) encamped around Mal Tepe and the 27th Regiment (two battalions 2000 rifles), a part of the 9th Division, encamped west of Maidos. The former, under Mustafa Kemal operated against the ANZAC left flank and centre while the latter attacked the ANZAC right at 400 Plateau.

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125 Sanders Five Years in Turkey, p62 and Bean, Gallipoli Mission p352
126 Kemal gives 0630 in his account and Zeki Bey gives 0530 Bean, Gallipoli Mission Appendix III p371
127 See PRO ADM 53 for ship logs and Australian War Memorial 4 for unit war diaries
Most authorities follow Bean in timing the first counterattack as beginning between 0900 and 1000 128. The time 0900 is usually given for the deployment of 27th Regiment at the ANZAC southern flank and 1000 for the arrival of 57th Regiment of 19th Division on the northern flank on the Sari Bair range overlooking Battleship Hill 129. It is probable these times are wrong and these attacks occurred one to two hours earlier.

In the case of 57th Regiment much can be learned from Kemal's own account written within a few days of the events; … "it was learnt from the sound of the guns of the ships that events were taking place at Ari Burnu 130. The whole division was made ready to march. On the one hand I was awaiting information from the commander of the Maidos area [Halil Sami Bey 27th Regiment], on the other hand from the Corps or Army commander. I ordered the cavalry squadron [150 men] of the division to advance in the direction of Kocacemen [hill 971 next to and overlooking Battleship Hill] to obtain information." 131

Two things stand out here. First the division had an hour or two to ready itself to march and second the cavalry squadron was despatched at a very early stage. As Kemal wrote, the first indication was the sound of firing which would have been heard soon after 0430. As to the cavalry these may have been the men referred to in 10th Battalion war diary 132. It reports that they were attacked by dismounted cavalry. It is more likely however, as most of 10th Battalion was on 400 Plateau, this battalion was attacked by two troops of cavalry that accompanied 27th Regiment 133. This cavalry was pushed forward before the 27th Regiment arrived and may have been deployed on Third Ridge as early as 0700 134. This account is in accord with other battalion war diary entries, which record 'counter attacks' very early in the day - even before the main Ottoman reserves could possibly have arrived.

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128 No exact time is given in Bean, Official History p290-294
129 Roberts "The Landing at Anzac: A Reassessment" p 32
130 Atatürk's Memoirs of the Anafartlar Battles, IWM 314.16 K35413
131 ibid p 4
132 Australian War Memorial 4 23/27/3. Kemal does not himself refer to the explanation Bean gives that 57th Regiment was already formed up at the time news arrived.
133 Turkish Official History Vol II p 102
134 ibid
Kemal continues “It was 6.30 hours that from a report which arrived from Halil Sami Bey it was learned that a force of enemy had climbed the heights of Ari Burnu and that I was required to send a battalion against them. Both from this report and as a result of the personal observation I had carried out at Mal Tepe, my firm opinion was...that an enemy attempt to land in strength in the neighbourhood of Kaba Tepe was now taking place...my whole division would be required to deal with the enemy. And so, without further delay I warned (57 regiment and a mountain battery) to be ready to move at once.” Kemal then “dictated an order of six paragraphs” for the division and left with this force. It must have been at the latest 7.00 am by his timing. There is reason to believe this movement was executed rapidly. Zeki Bey who commanded the 1st Battalion of 57th Regiment relates it thus” My battalion was on parade when the news of your landing came to us...It chanced that there had been ordered for that morning an exercise over the ground, especially towards Koja Chemen Tepe (hill 971). There had previously been exercises of this sort, and our regiment, the 57th, had mustered early for this one. It was at that moment that the report came”.

The ground over which they advanced is easier terrain for formed bodies than that the ANZAC Corps crossed and it had a number of tracks one of which, leading to the summit of the range, Kemal took. Ross’s map calculated just this manoeuvre and estimated one and a half hours was required. This would place Kemal’s force within a kilometre of Battleship Hill by 0830, by his own reckoning of the time. He says without delay he immediately threw in the 2nd Battalion of 57th Regiment and later, as they came up the rest of the force. He states this later effort, when the whole regiment attacked, occurred at 10.00 o’clock. Another officer present, Colonel Sami Bey commanding the 1st Battalion of 57th Regiment says it was 1030 when the first engagement of his regiment took place.

Now when was this really? At 0810, 3rd Brigade war diary reports a counter attack on 12th Battalion was repulsed without going into further details. But as the main body of 12th Battalion was in action about Baby 700, it may also be the one referred to in the battalion war diary. The 12th Battalion war diary reports “enemy

135 Bean, Gallipoli Mission p 131
discovered in strong force attempting to get around our flank. While no time is given for the 12th Battalion entry it is the next one immediately after an entry detailing the landing of the battalion. At this time on the ANZAC left the only other enemy units were the remnants of the company defending the beach and perhaps the 19th division’s cavalry squadron [dismounted]. In short there are no other candidates. This war diary entry can only be referring to the second battalion of the 57th Regiment. The Summary of Operations of 1st Australian Division states “7 to 8.15? Enemies first counter attack [sic] was repulsed…” Other references to counter attacks were recorded in battalion diaries from around this time.

Now if Kemal’s timing is one hour later than that used by the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force then he really left Boghali at 0600 and the first counterattack of the 2nd Battalion of the 57th Regiment began down the Sari Bair Range towards Battleship Hill at 0800, two hours before that usually accepted. An hour later the whole regiment of three battalions attacked.

Turning now to the times given by Bean in the Australian official History: His notes from an interview with Margetts found their way into the final draft and state Margetts looked at his watch at one point. It was 0900. The next few pages create the impression the initial counter attack of 2nd Battalion followed by the counter attack of the 57th Regiment happened some time, perhaps an hour, after this. A close reading though reveals that, when he glanced at his watch, Margetts was at the bottom of the hollow between Baby 700 and Battleship Hill. From there it is not possible to see what was transpiring on Battleship Hill. At that time the first counterattack was already well underway though Margetts could not see it.

When the whole 57th Regiment attacked it was sufficient to take Battleship Hill and part of Baby 700 and cause the ANZAC line to retire to Baby 700, the next, slightly lower hill on the Sari Bair Range. It must have been this movement that was observed by Sinclair-Maclagan:

136 ibid app III p 371
137 PRO WO 95/4344
138 Australian War Memorial 4 roll 803
“Fortunately the driving in of the line on Baby 700 had been observed from another part of the front. Between 9 and 10 o’clock Colonel Maclagan, returning from his visit to the 400 Plateau, had seen in the distance the retirement of the Australians and the pressure of the Turks” 140. The above evidence indicates it must have been 0900 not 1000 hours.

Kemal states after he committed the whole of the 57th Regiment to the attack he dictated a message to his corps commander and times it 25 April 0936 hours. He wrote: “The 27th Regiment is engaging the enemy…I have begun an attack entirely on the left flank of the enemy…After about half an hours fight it was seen that the enemy troops who had advanced as far as hill 261 (Battleship Hill) had begun to retire” 141. So by Kemal’s own timing his attack on Battleship Hill has succeeded by 9.30, half an hour before it had begun according to English language sources. Even if Kemal and Mediterranean Expeditionary Force times are the same the Ottoman counterattack went in at very least an hour before has generally been believed. And if the above argument has any veracity it was more like two hours before.

Turning now to the southern counterattack, that on the right flank of the ANZAC Corps directed at the northern end of 400 Plateau and conducted by the Ottoman 27th Regiment from Maidos, all sources agree this occurred before the attack on the left. Kemal had just launched the attack of the whole 57th Regiment and relates what happened next. “At that time a cavalry officer...came up to me and told me that the 27th Regiment had begun to engage the enemy from the slopes to the west of Kocadere above Kemalyeri” 142. One reason the 27th Regiment was able to launch its attack earlier than that of the 57th was this force was encamped closer to Gaba Tepe than Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ realised. On April 23rd the camp of the 27th was bombed by the Royal Naval Air Service and the camp was, as a consequence, moved a kilometre west. The change was noted by the RNAS on 24 April, probably too late to advise ANZAC Corps HQ in time. This move placed it closer to Gaba Tepe and into the cover of an olive grove where it would be less easily detected from the air. The Turkish official history gives 0800 as the time this

139 Australian War Memorial 4 23/26/5,4 23/28/2,23/29/2
140 Bean, Official History p294
141 Ataturk’s Memoirs of the Anafartlar Battles IWM 314.16, K35413 p 8
attack on the ANZAC right flank began \(^{143}\). This regiment had come from the southeast to near the southern end of third ridge, marched along the ridge in sight of Australians on 400 Plateau and deployed about the centre of Third Ridge at Kemalyeri. If this time is correct they were in view for half an hour before they attacked.

To summarize, it appears the Ottoman response was more rapid than has previously been realised. There is reason to doubt the existence of any real ‘gap’ in time between the arrival of the Corps on Second Ridge and the arrival of considerable numbers of opponents.

Of course it may be argued the timing problem endemic in the Ottoman Army may lessen the value of evidence originating from that source but if this is so we are still left with the supporting evidence from the war diaries of individuals, the battalions of the 3\(^{rd}\) Brigade, the brigade diary and the divisional summary all reporting such early counterattacks. It could further be countered to the proposition advanced here that these reports merely refer to responses to the landing by the Ottoman company in reserve behind Gaba Tepe or the activities of the cavalry squadron sent very early in the day by Kemal. This still would not explain reports of an early strong counterattack on the ANZAC left and in the present writer’s view, it is the less likely interpretation of events. More likely the attack of the 27\(^{th}\) Regiment went in against 400 Plateau at or before 0800, one battalion of 57th regiment attacked Battleship Hill at about the same time and by 0900 the whole 57th Regiment had taken that hill and was being held at Baby 700. While both of these attacks gained some important ground they were brought to a halt at the latest by 1000 the time usually given for the start of these attacks.

**DID SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN MAKE THE CORRECT DECISIONS?**

Sinclair Maclagan's decision to halt at Second Ridge rather than press onto the Third Ridge is controversial if it is imagined there was a gap of time between the

\(^{142}\) ibid p 7
securing of the covering position and the arrival of the enemy reserve. Such a gap might have provided an opportunity for a further advance and a potentially different outcome to the day. For this reason it is a pivotal question around which most of the disputes concerning the first phase revolve. It has been seen that there probably was no such gap and it is now appropriate to turn to the argument that Sinclair Maclagan’s decision to halt on second ridge was justifiable and appropriate.

The orders received from Braithwaite the Chief of Staff of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force by ANZAC Corps HQ stated: “The objective assigned to the army corps is the ridge over which the Gallipoli-Maidos and Boghali-Kojadere roads run, and especially Mal Tepe”. But this is not to be taken in one move for “the first essential for the covering force will be to establish itself on the hills in squares 224, 237 and 238”. The Corps order for the 1st Australian Division said “this semicircular system of ridges lends itself to the establishment of a strong covering position. Whether it will be necessary or not to include the crest of the mountain must be left to your discretion. As soon as the 1st Division is disembarked that of the 2nd Division will commence. By the time the 2nd Division begins to land, sufficient troops should be available to admit of a further advance (and) an effort will be made to storm Mal Tepe”.

So it was clear there was to be a pause lasting until the 2nd Division was deployed, expected to be between 0800 and 0900.

The Division order for the landing, issued by Major-General W.T.Bridges, commanding First Australian Division was more specific: The covering force …will occupy the ridge between square 212 (i) and 238 (v)”. This is Third Ridge from its southern end almost behind Gaba Tepe up to where it joins the main Sari Bair range at Hill 971, the height just beyond Battleship Hill. The covering force in fact halted on Second Ridge, a kilometre short of this. The evidence this was a sound decision will be presented in the following.

143 Turkish Official History, Vol II p 104
144 PRO WO 106/705
145 ibid
146 ibid
147 Aspinall Oglander, Military Operations, Gallipoli, appendix 16 p 44
First, as we have seen, Sinclair-Maclagan and his superiors were well aware of the location of the enemy reserve and its function. They knew of the likelihood that the Ottoman Reserve would soon be thrust at them; indeed they had calculated how long it might take and from whence it might approach. How soon was it likely to arrive was a question the 3rd Brigade staff ought to have addressed, and as the notes on the map Captain Ross used indicate, they had done their homework. We have further seen that the Ottoman counterattack was most likely underway about the time Sinclair-Maclagan is said to have made his decision.

Second his orders gave him a large measure of discretion. Sinclair-Maclagan was, after all the commander of all forces landed until his immediate superior, the commander of the division, Bridges, assumed command.

Third the Ottoman counter attack was under way earlier than has previously been thought and no sensible commander attempts to advance in the face of a strong attack. Far better to repulse it then, if possible, advance.

Roberts among others has argued that the advance to Third Ridge would have only involved a manoeuvre of a kilometre over good ground. It is true the distance was not great and the ground presents no obstacle but the issue is more complex. Was it wise to advance across Legge Valley to seize Third Ridge when to do so would expose his left flank to enfilading fire from 57th Regiment (3000 rifles), a machine gun company and at least one mountain battery on the Sari Bair range? The effect of machine guns and rifle fire is particularly devastating when in enfilade and the slope from Battleship Hill and Baby 700 down over Mortar Ridge is suitable for such enfilading fire. Moreover an advance would only have been possible in the centre for the right flank of the ANZAC Corps was also under pressure from 27th Regiment which had come from Maida and deployed against 400 Plateau. It was in a position to enfilade the right of the line though from less favourable ground. From the discussion of the time factor it is apparent these two forces, together about as strong as the ANZAC Corps units to hand, were moving

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148 See Roberts, “The Landing at Anzac: A Reassessment”.

into position and had been observed when Sinclair-Maclagan took his decision. Yet another sound reason for not advancing was he would be extending the length of his front in so doing. British Army training manuals give 2000m as the desired length of front for a brigade to hold defensively. The front currently held was 4000m and the Third Ridge position would have stretched this to 5000m.

Finally knowing the remainder of the Ottoman reserve might well be still to his front in its camps around Mal Tepe he risked cresting third ridge to find himself immediately opposed by them before his force could adopt a defensive posture. Even had elements of 3rd Brigade established themselves on Third Ridge they would have been under enfilade fire from artillery and machine guns overlooking them from Sari Bair as long as the enemy held that height.

Third Ridge is a better defensive position than Second Ridge as the country there stretches away to the east providing good fields of fire but Sinclair-Maclagan, thought it better to hold what ground he had gained rather than risk all. At this time he had only 3rd Brigade in the line. 2nd Brigade was completing its assembly near the beach. The plan had been for it to be committed to the left of 3rd Brigade with a view to advancing up Sari Bair ridge to seize the dominating ground of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971. It was in fact committed to the right of the line about 400 Plateau. This was Sinclair Maclagan’s second important decision.

THE SECOND DECISION-TO COMMIT 2ND BRIGADE TO THE RIGHT OF 3RD BRIGADE

The timing of this decision is usually given as about the same time Sinclair Maclagan decided to halt on Second Ridge at about 0730. One strong piece of evidence indicates he made this decision much earlier, less than an hour after he landed. A message was sent by runner from Sinclair Maclagan to his Brigade Major Brand at 0600: "Major Brand. Keep advanced companies well forward second brigade coming in on our right". On the back of this order is the time it was given - 0600 and the signature is that of Captain Ross, the Intelligence officer of 3rd

149 General Staff Field Service Regulations, Ch VII, Section 104, Para 3, pg 114
Brigade. The simplest explanation would be that as soon as he landed Sinclair Maclagan realised the 3rd Brigade was too far to the left and he decided, as far as it was possible, to swap the tasks of the brigades and shift the advance right to its correct alignment.

It is probable there was more to it than this. It was mentioned earlier there was one serious error made by Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Staff concerning the deployment of the Ottoman forces. On 14 April Commander Samson and Lieutenant Brodie of the Royal Naval Air Service squadron charged with mapping the enemy position from the air reported ‘Big camp, about 700 tents’ in square 203t. This location is four kilometres south east of Gaba Tepe under Palamutluk Ridge and a force of almost 8000 men, an Ottoman Division (indicated by 700 tents) there would constitute a serious threat to the right flank of the ANZAC Corps landing. Also such a force would be closer to the landing than 27th regiment at Maidos and could be expected to intervene earlier in the day. This information was passed on to ANZAC Corps headquarters the next day.

The problem is a check of Ottoman sources reveals no such force existed in that location. While it is difficult to be precise about the doings of small Ottoman units no force remotely approaching a division is unaccounted for. Presumably Samson and Brodie were further east than they thought and observing the camp of the 19th Division about Mal Tepe. Much of what was observed from the air was photographed but map square 203 was not.

This error was realised in the following few days. A map showing Ottoman dispositions to 18 April has the camp crossed out and “not visible now” scribbled next to it. On the same day a list of corrections to be made to maps was issued by Mediterranean Expeditionary Force but not received until 22 April. Correction 22 states “Camp of 700 tents at 203T not seen by balloon observer”. Another aerial reconnaissance report on 20 April notes the camp is “not there now”. The document then advises “The above corrections should be made to the copies of the

150 Australian War Memorial 4 roll 748
151 PRO WO 30/57/61
152 Australian War Memorial 4 roll 748
maps supplied and the map redated 20 April"\textsuperscript{154}. On these maps the 700-tent camp now had an asterisk next to it meaning "doubtful works"\textsuperscript{155}.

The late arrival of these corrections would explain why on 19 April Birdwood wrote "we know they have a camp of 700 tents near the "ruins" on the north west corner of the Plateau, and the troops from these will of course rush out...directly the attack has started"\textsuperscript{156}. The ruins are marked on all maps in square 203 next to the location of the non-existent camp.

It appears some ANZAC Corps officers did not learn that the camp was not there until too late. Of these the most important was Sinclair Maclagan who Bean says expected a heavy counter attack from the south and diverted 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade in that direction to meet it\textsuperscript{157}. When Sinclair Maclagan told Mc Cay, commander of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade that he must move south instead of north Mc Cay wished to go forward and examine the situation himself. The response was "There isn’t time. I assure you my right will be turned if you do not do this"\textsuperscript{158}.

This decision was based on the one serious flaw in the picture built up of Ottoman defences. It need not have been so for the map used by Sinclair Maclagan’s intelligence officer on the day of the landing contains no reference to the camp by the ruins\textsuperscript{159}. The commander of a brigade then dictated a message to his brigade major, written by his intelligence officer, relating to the supposed existence of an Ottoman force threatening their right without any concerned realising such a force was no longer believed to exist. How this can have come about is a mystery meriting further study.

It has also been suggested the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigades deployment to the right instead of the left meant that the thrust inland lacked power\textsuperscript{160}. Sinclair Maclagan has been

\textsuperscript{153} ibid
\textsuperscript{154} ibid
\textsuperscript{155} Australian War Memorial map collection G7432,G1S65, Gallipoli V. 1a
\textsuperscript{156} Birdwood to Fitzgerald PRO 30/57/61
\textsuperscript{157} Bean. Official History p 364
\textsuperscript{158} Roberts, "The Landing at ANZAC, A Reassessment", p 30
\textsuperscript{159} Australian War Memorial 4 ormf 0088 roll 783
\textsuperscript{160} Roberts, "The Landing at ANZAC, A Reassessment" 30-33

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blamed for this. However the contention here is that this explanation misses the main point. If the objective of the landing was to pin the Ottoman Reserve and a full blooded counter attack was expected, even desirable when the task of the Corps is considered in the overall plan, then it was better the Corps deployed defensively on the first tolerable piece of terrain rather than be caught by the counter attack still manoeuvring. Of course this presumes the counter attack will be a strong one. It was known at least one full Ottoman division and an additional regiment near Maidos was available and by the time 2nd Brigade was deploying into the line the Corps had only available a force roughly two thirds that strength in rifles and machine guns but lacking any artillery.

The argument here then is that in spite of the one significant intelligence error on which Sinclair Maclagan based his orders his decision to halt was still the right one. When we look at how near the ANZAC Corps came to being pushed into the sea in the late afternoon it is easy to imagine how much worse might have been their situation had they been further inland on a longer front with both flanks turned when the counterattack came.

It might be thought these questions could more easily be resolved had we an account from Sinclair-Maclagan himself. Sinclair-Maclagan was not a great one for explaining his thought process at the time nor indeed did he ever commit much to paper concerning the landing. There is "Armarda Moves", an article appearing in Reveille in 1932 in which Sinclair Maclagan confines his account to the movement from Egypt to the beaches and there is a letter in the Australian War Memorial responding to Bean after the war saying he has no personal papers that would be of interest.

In Bean’s notes on interviews of participants conducted within days of the events there is however a paragraph from an interview with Sinclair Maclagan. Bean’s style throughout is to summarise what is said and not to quote directly. It is entitled ‘3rd brigade confidential and not for publication’. "Maclagan said that if he lost 50% of his men he would only have 2000 to hold 5000 yards. He saw the enemy thick on
gun ridge (Third Ridge) and decided that the best thing was to dig in where he was until reinforcements came up"\footnote{Australian War Memorial 38 3drl 606 item 25}.

SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE -THE PREPARATORY BOMBARDMENT 0900 TO 1600

The first phase of the battle may be said to have ended when the manoeuvring for position was done. The ANZAC Corps was no longer advancing but rather concentrating on holding the ground gained. The first counter attack, by 57th Regiment down the line of the Sari Bair ridge and the 27th Regiment against the northern part of 400 Plateau had been held with the loss of Battleship Hill in the north or left of the line and part of 400 Plateau in the south. Now, for six hours Mustafa Kemal who had been given command of all forces in the vicinity of Ari Burnu, assembled a powerful artillery concentration and pounded the ANZAC position to prepare it for his main assault late in the day. This would be an attempt to throw the ANZAC Corps into the sea by dark.

No authority seems to have yet attempted to determine just how powerful was this bombardment nor precisely what its effect was. The discussion following will then centre on two issues: the strength of the bombardment and the effect, both moral and physical, upon the ANZAC Corps. These themes will appear again in the section dealing with the relative strengths of the armies.

Before we examine the evidence in detail, it is first necessary to explain the primary place in early twentieth century warfare held by artillery. In battle "artillery is the principal agent of destruction" \footnote{Clauswitz, On War p291}. This was true enough when Clausewitz wrote it and one hundred years on it was all the more true and regarded as the great tactical lesson of the first few months of the Great War. Approximately 70 per cent of all battlefield casualties in that war were from artillery fire. The British Official History volume on Medical Services reported that in the war "shell and shrapnel wounds are in a very much higher proportion than in any previous war"\footnote{MacPherson, Official History of the War, Medical Services, Vol IV p 4}. Closer
to our subject an appreciation regarding Gallipoli written on 25th March pointed to
the primacy of place held by artillery: "throughout this war none of the combatants
has ever been successful in breaking quickly through even indifferent
entrenchments.... Success has only been obtained after long and careful [artillery]
preparation and the expenditure of an enormous amount of high explosive gun
ammunition both from quick fire and howitzers" 164. Largely because of this lack
of artillery on the part of the attackers the writer, Hunter-Weston who led the 29th
Division at Cape Helles, concluded ominously "there is not in present
circumstances a reasonable chance of success" 165.

What then was the strength of the Ottoman artillery? Most writers take their cue
from Aspinall-Oglander’s Official History. Aspinall Oglander placed one battery
on 400 Plateau, one two gun battery at Gaba Tepe, another two gun battery a little
inland of Gaba Tepe, one with 27th Regiment and three batteries with 19th Division
under Mustafa Kemal’s command. This gives 24 pieces, mostly 75mm German field
and mountain guns. One can identify about the same number in Bean. He does not
give a final number, clearly identifying only four batteries but a close reading
shows he probably thought there were five 166. The evidence to be presented in what
follows suggests as many as 44 artillery pieces in 11 batteries, or almost twice those
previously identified, fired upon the ANZAC Corps in the course of the day and 41
of these by the late afternoon were bombarding the ANZAC position. The evidence
comes from four sources: Ottoman Army maps and orders of battle, modern
Turkish and German histories, war diaries of various units of the ANZAC Corps
and ships logs from 2nd Squadron, the naval force under Admiral C Thursby.

The standard order of battle for an Ottoman Division of 1915 was 36 artillery pieces
in 9 batteries of four guns each. However, the army expanded greatly at the
beginning of the war and was rarely able to equip all its divisions so well. Also
there were great material losses in the Balkan wars which had not yet been fully
replaced. The six divisions of the Fifth Army, that which defended the Gallipoli
Peninsula, had according to its order of battle, 24 pieces each or four field and two

164 Hamilton papers, Liddell Hart Centre, Kings College, 17/7/30
165 ibid
166 Bean Official History p303, 395, 278 and especially 390)
mountain batteries in most of the divisions. In addition two batteries each of four heavy guns (one a mixed heavy field battery and the other a 150mm howitzer battery) was attached to the battalion of 27th Regiment charged with the immediate defences of the beaches in the Gaba Tepe vicinity. The rest of the army artillery reserve was with 5th Army Headquarters in Gallipoli town itself or deployed on Kilid Bahr Plateau facing the Dardanelles and Cape Helles. Evidence will be presented here that all the guns of 19th Division and five other batteries, eleven in all, were probably in action that day against the ANZAC Corps.

It is first necessary to place the batteries generally accepted as having been present. There was one at Gaba Tepe—the mixed heavy battery and one field battery on 400 Plateau captured early in the day (with the exception of one piece) then lost again 167. A third battery was deployed early on Sari Bair ridge to support the attack of 57th Regiment and one arrived with and fired in support of 27th Regiment’s early attack on the right of the ANZAC line. Bean also records one more arriving around midday and firing on 400 Plateau from Scrubby Knoll and one later on Anderson’s Knoll firing on Bolton’s Ridge 168. This gives 24 pieces in six batteries.

Only one English language source gives more than this. In Soldiers of the Prophet, C Murphy gives the 19th Division four field and two mountain batteries 169. As there were, as will presently be shown, three other batteries already deployed about the beach defences and two batteries from 9th Division were with 27th Regiment this supports the argument by giving eleven batteries overall.

According to the modern Turkish Official History, other Ottoman sources and evidence from RNAS aerial reconnaissance as well as Royal Navy sources there was also a battery of guns on Palamutluk ridge sited to fire along Brighton Beach. This battery, of 150mm howitzers is overlooked by Bean and Aspinall-Oglander 170.

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167 It is said this battery did not fire, so rapid was the ANZAC advance. The Turkish Official History tells a more plausible story p 90. It had fired on the shipping but in order to fire on the beaches below it was being manhandled to the seaward edge of 400 Plateau when the attackers suddenly arrived there and overran it. This also may account for Bean thinking there were two batteries on 400 Plateau at dawn.
168 Bean, Official History p391
169 Murphy, Soldiers of the Prophet p 142
170 Aspinall-Oglander, in Military Operations Gallipoli Vol I p158 describes it as two, not four, 15cm guns “a little inland from Gaba Tepe”
It must be the battery described in the Turkish Official History as a “four piece battery of short barrelled 150mm howitzers deployed east of Palamutluk Ridge… to fire primarily into the Kabatepe-Camtepe angle”\textsuperscript{171}. It was from the 5\textsuperscript{th} Army artillery reserve and opened fire at 5.00 according to the same source. It was also located by air reconnaissance and shelled by \textit{HMS Majestic} early in the day\textsuperscript{172}.

Secondly there is the number of guns in support of 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment camped west of Maidos. All English language sources agree there was one battery but it seems another battery from 9\textsuperscript{th} Division came up on the Ottoman left later in the day. “A 77mm mountain battery was camped at the roadside” between Kilitbahir and Eceabat (Maidos)” at a place called Camburnu\textsuperscript{173}. This is a kilometre and a half south east of the camp of the battery with 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment (see map three). The battery camped with 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment is not marked on all British intelligence maps but the latter is and this may account for the confusion. Later in the day “The mountain battery at Camburnu was sent a short order which told them to close up to the ridge west of the village of Kocadere”\textsuperscript{174}. This would place it near Scrubby Knoll about two kilometres north of Anderson’s knoll where a battery was identified as having been firing on Bolton’s Ridge through the afternoon\textsuperscript{175}. No time is given but it seems this battery formed one of up to seven eventually deployed along the spine of Third Ridge from where it meets Sari Bair down to just south of Scrubby Knoll (see maps two and three). Only two of these are definitely identified by Bean\textsuperscript{176}. This cannot have been the original battery under the command of 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment because the Turkish Official History states first that 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment had one battery under command then “upon the persistent requests of the commanding officer of 27\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, the mountain artillery battery at Camburnu was ordered to come under his command and move at once in the direction of Kabatepe”\textsuperscript{177}.

\textsuperscript{171} Turkish Official History, Vol II p 92
\textsuperscript{172} ibid p98 and \textit{HMS Majestic} log PRO ADM 53/47972
\textsuperscript{173} Turkish Official History, Vol II p 101
\textsuperscript{174} ibid p102
\textsuperscript{175} Bean, \textit{Official History} p 391
\textsuperscript{176} ibid
\textsuperscript{177} Turkish Official History, Vol II p 101

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Thus far six batteries have been identified and located and five remain. All of these took no part in the early morning fighting as they formed part of the mass of 19th Division, which remained in reserve while 57th and 27th Regiment made the first counterattack. One of these, the second battery in the field artillery battalion allocated to 57th Regiment, most likely joined the regiment on Sari Bair Range late in the morning. It is possible however it deployed further down the slope towards Third Ridge and supported 57th regiment from there. Colonel Zeki Bey who commanded a battalion of 57th Regiment told Bean the battery that initially left 57th Regiment camp was deployed near Scrubby Knoll. It may be he is confusing this with the second battery. We know from many ANZAC sources there were, early in the day, one or two batteries higher on the main ridge firing on the Baby 700 - Nek area and sometimes on troops landing. Bean was sure there was one and Margetts thought by 1515 there were six gun salvoes being fired at the Nek. Neither this nor the evidence from Ottoman and modern Turkish sources makes it entirely clear whether one or two batteries were deployed on Sari Bair but the present writer believes two is more probable.

Two more batteries were attached to 72nd Regiment and these were moved up to a position from which they could support the attack of their regiment later in the day:

“At 10.40 hours the commanding officer of 19th Division [Mustafa Kemal] gave the following order...the field artillery battalion shall immediately move in the direction of Kocadere.” Later “At 1330 hours Lt. Colonel Mustafa Kemal ordered this Field Artillery Battalion to position themselves at the western slopes of Kocadere Koyu.” This is just east of Third Ridge in the vicinity of Scrubby Knoll. There were three battalions of two batteries each in 19th Division so two more batteries were now coming into action about the centre of Third Ridge. It was this massing of artillery on Third Ridge which accounts for the great increase in fire noted by many ANZAC Corps observers as the afternoon wore on. Bean recorded in his notes a conversation with Weir of 10th Battalion on 400 Plateau: "we reported to brigadier that 9 guns on other ridge couldn't be taken and he had told us to dig in.

178 Bean, Gallipoli Mission p133-6
179 Bean diaries and notes Australian War Memorial 38 d1 1722 item 2
180 ibid p 112
They had shrapnel on us all morning but in the afternoon before 4pm it was particularly bad. This shrapnel came from north east, we could see flashes\textsuperscript{182}. This would seem to be referring to the centre of Third Ridge in the vicinity of Scrubby Knoll and the ninth gun, if the count is accurate, is likely to be the single gun which escaped from 400 Plateau and was later deployed on Third Ridge.

Thus far we have three batteries originally present, one gun from the battery overrun on 400 plateau and five more batteries have arrived. Two remain unaccounted for- the third of the three artillery battalions present with 19\textsuperscript{th} Division. These eight guns came forward with that regiment when it moved from its camp to Palamutluk Ridge\textsuperscript{183}. They then advanced to Anderson's Knoll to support the attack of the infantry regiment on Pine and Boulton's Ridges in the late afternoon. It is not known for sure if they fired before this but they were certainly in a suitable position to do so\textsuperscript{184}.

To summarize it was 44 not 24 Ottoman artillery pieces that engaged the ANZAC Corps on 25 April. The five batteries present not accounted for in scholarship thus far were as follows: One additional heavy howitzer battery from 5\textsuperscript{th} Army Reserve, one additional field battery from 9\textsuperscript{th} Division and three batteries from 19\textsuperscript{th} Division. Allowing for the battery all sources agree was put out of commission on 400 Plateau very early on and the one gun rescued from this battery the afternoon bombardment on the ANZAC position was made by 41, not 20 artillery pieces. By 1600 eight of these guns were on Sari Bair, four were at Gaba Tepe, four on Palamutluk Ridge and the remaining 25 were deployed along Third Ridge.

The guns on Third Ridge were probably not all seen from the ANZAC position for such is the shape of the ridge and the foliage thereon it is possible they deployed immediately to the rear of the crest. Here there still are many gun pits indicating the practicality of firing flat trajectory guns from this position. These particular gun pits were possibly not there on the day though at least three (empty) gun positions on

\textsuperscript{181} ibid p 114
\textsuperscript{182} Bean diaries and notes Australian War Memorial 38 drl 1722 item 2
\textsuperscript{183} Turkish Official History Vol II, p 114
\textsuperscript{184} These may be the guns Kaizim Pasha in replying to Bean's questions said did not fire on the day. This is unlikely though possible. Gallipoli Mission Appendix I
Third Ridge were noted by air reconnaissance before battle-prepared for just such an eventuality and a clear indicator the defenders had planned for an attack in this area.

All present on the ANZAC side report the firing was most intense at the time of the main counterattack and tailed off after it had failed. While it is not known how many rounds were fired, it is not at all difficult to fire 400 per piece per day when there are plenty of targets and little interference from counter battery fire. Several Australian division artillery pieces did in fact fire 400 rounds on 26 April even when under some counter battery fire. If we regard 400 rounds as a maximum and reduce by half to allow for a variety of factors inhibiting the number of rounds fired including late arrival and ceasing fire when spotting planes were overhead, it is probable a bombardment of something like 8,000 rounds, all of shrapnel, were fired into the ANZAC position.

One way of assessing the strength of an artillery bombardment is to compare the number of guns to the length of front being bombarded. On Second Ridge 4 kilometres of front from Baby 700 to Bolton’s Ridge were being bombarded by as many as forty guns giving ten guns per kilometre. At Neuve Chappelle in March 1915 60 guns were concentrated against a two-kilometre front. About one fifth were heavy guns in both cases but the bombardment at Neuve Chappelle was of short duration and only 120 rounds per gun were fired. As a rough estimate this bombardment was of the same strength but twice the intensity of that on Second Ridge owing to the shorter front of the target. The German positions at Neuve Chappelle were several month old trench systems providing much better cover and a proportion of the fire had to be devoted to cutting the wire. Thus the effect upon the defenders may well have been about the same - at Neuve Chappelle it was sufficient for the following infantry assault to easily take the first and part of the second line of trenches. Of course it is impossible to be precise about this but the

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185 Australian War Memorial 25 367/616 and 186 also see Hamilton Papers in Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives 17/5/8 appendix 2 notes by commander 3rd Australian field artillery brigade, Hornor in The Gunners, A History of Australian Artillery gives an account of two field guns firing between them 800 rounds on 26th April pp 92-93
186 Bristow, A Serious Disappointment, The Battle of Auber's Ridge p 48
187 Bristow ibid and Bean, Official History p 391
general point to be made is the strength of the Ottoman bombardment was at least approaching that of similar sized operations on the Western Front in early 1915.

It was noted by the defenders that most of this fire was directed at 400 Plateau and Baby 700 and the Nek; the two places where Kemal was planning his counter attack later in the day. Judging by the deployment of the Ottoman artillery, this fire was probably split about evenly. At least once in the afternoon Kemal directed that the fire be concentrated on particular parts of the line presumably those where he planned to assault\textsuperscript{188}. Observation from the higher slopes onto Baby 700 is fair and the top of 400 Plateau can be easily seen from Third Ridge as the plateau slopes gently inland.

A good example of the general difficulty of answering these questions is contained in Gallipoli Mission. This book first appeared in 1941 and Bean is addressing some of the issues he felt may not have been dealt with in the Australian Official History. One is artillery and he concludes after careful going over of the evidence and speaking again to participants that there were seven guns in two batteries on or very near 400 Plateau at dawn\textsuperscript{189}. There is nothing in Turkish nor Ottoman sources to support this and much that confirms it was not so\textsuperscript{190}.

**LIMITING FACTORS ON OTTOMAN BOMBARDMENT**

It has seemed reasonable to reduce the Ottoman bombardment to half of its potential maximum because it is not possible to precisely quantify the factors that may have limited it: Joseph Poniatowski was present in Constantinople as the head of the Austrian Imperial Mission and wrote there was a shortage of artillery ammunition in the course of the eight month Gallipoli campaign but if this was so it was not obvious on the first day\textsuperscript{191}. All ANZAC sources verify the bombardment

\textsuperscript{188} Turkish Official History p 116
\textsuperscript{189} Bean, Gallipoli Mission p 148
\textsuperscript{190} While the numbers and locations of Ottoman artillery is not beyond question it is clear there was only one battery on 400 Plateau. As a further measure of the difficulty of establishing numbers and locations Tim Travers of Calgary University has an Ottoman map showing yet another battery on W Hills in the Suvla Bay area. Modern Turkish sources provide no evidence for this
\textsuperscript{191} Poniatowski J Der Zusammenbruch des Osmanischen Reiches, pp130f. Poniatowski was head of the Imperial Austrian Mission in Istanbul during war
only finally ceased on dark and was resumed, with less intensity, at dawn the next day 192. This indicates that the Ottoman artillery was, at least on 25 April, plentifully supplied. The establishment of each battery held 500 rounds 193. An artilleryman of the 9th Division captured on the first day said that his battery and one other in position "beyond Gaba Tepe" have "a reserve of 1200 shells in 50 carts" 194. Moreover on 27 April the Ottoman artillery was able to deliver yet another strong bombardment in support of another major attack.

A second limiting factor was the naval bombardment. The naval counter battery fire did not knock out a single gun on 25 April but it did inhibit their fire somewhat. A balloon tethered to the SS Manica observed and called down fire. Additionally two aircraft, spotting for two battleships made four flights each over the beachhead. "We were up in the air at dawn and saw the whole show. Our first job was to locate the enemy field guns and spot the supporting ships fire at them. It was easy to begin with but very soon the Ottoman forces realised that it was the flash of their guns, which gave them away, and they ceased to fire whenever a seaplane was in the neighbourhood. This became so apparent that Birdwood sent off a request that, as far as possible, we should keep a sea plane continuously over the enemy position to keep down their fire" 195. While this sounds positive at the end of this piece Jock Strain, the Chief Observer for the RNAS at ANZAC judged the effect of the naval bombardment of the Ottoman artillery to be "generally useless" 196.

In the light of this evidence neither of these factors can reasonably be said to have had a greatly inhibiting effect upon the Ottoman artillery.

EFFECT OF THE BOMBARDMENT

The line taken earlier, to which we now turn, is that it most likely the effect of the artillery bombardment was the prime factor leading to the near collapse of the

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192 Bean, Official History p 390
193 All shells fired by the Ottoman artillery were shrapnel. Bean, Official History p301. Also see Handbook of the Turkish Army, Second Provisional Edition, Intelligence Dept Cairo, Govt press Mar 1915 p54
194 ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary PRO 157/668 30/4 appendix II
195 Strain unpublished memoirs. RAF Archive B2013-2014 p56
196 Strain diary vol 2 p2-4
ANZAC Corps. This may be assessed in three ways; its effect on upsetting the landing schedule, the morale of those under bombardment and the casualties it inflicted upon them.

THE EFFECT ON SHIPPING-DELAYED ARRIVALS

Arguably the greatest contribution of the Ottoman artillery to their effort was the disruption of the landing schedule of the ANZAC Corps caused by fire directed, in the morning, at the transport ships close inshore. Provision had been made in the landing plan to move the ships further offshore should they come under unacceptable shellfire and this was done. The transports were moved beyond range with the result that from 1200 to 1630 no reinforcements at all arrived on the beach.

It had been envisaged in the plan that the ANZAC Corps would be in superior numbers compared to the enemy it was likely to encounter by 8am. This was the case for at least 8000 men had landed by 0830 and only two Ottoman regiments (5000 rifles) had as yet deployed against it. Had the landing gone as planned the entire infantry component of the Corps, two 6 piece mountain batteries and an Australian field artillery battery of four guns should have been ashore by midnight. But owing to the necessity to move the transport ships out of range of shore based artillery, only 13 and a half battalions and one mountain battery were ashore when the main counter attack eventuated.

Not all the credit for the disruption of the landing plan accrues to the shore based artillery. An Ottoman battleship the Torgud Reis was in the narrows and shelled the shipping off Ari Burnu. Admiral Thursby described this in his report: "This operation [the disembarkation of the main body] was somewhat delayed as the transports could not take up their positions on account of the heavy fire brought to bear by some Turkish battleship in the straights near Kilia Leman. They [sic] were however soon driven off by our covering ships". The Torgud Reis was observed

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197 Calwell, The Dardanelles p 101
198 PRO CAB 19/32 mf 173
199 Bean, Official History p 314
200 Admiral Thursby’s papers NMM, Dardanelles folder box 2
201 ibid
by aerial reconnaissance and at 0712 the battleship *HMS Triumph* opened fire on square 205J. This location is a kilometre offshore, east of Maidos, where the Torgud Reis was located.

It should not be thought the effect of the main preparatory bombardment from midday to 1600 was much diminished by firing on the shipping. The latter occurred in the afternoon and the former in the morning. Between about 1200 and 1600 there were no transports within range of Ottoman field artillery and the Torgud Reis had already departed. The importance of this disruption of the landing plan was it denied the ANZAC Corps commander the reinforcements with which to respond to his enemy’s moves. Sinclair Maclagan and later Bridges had to commit nearly every company as it arrived in the late morning and the latter was forced to hold the 4th Battalion near the beaches for several hours of the afternoon as it was his only reserve and no more troops were landing. Thus the fire upon the ships contributed significantly to the disarray into which the Corps fell.

**MORALE EFFECT**

Evidence from all ranks attests to the severe effect of the bombardment as well as its particular effect on morale:

The Corps commander in his famous note to Sir Ian Hamilton at the end of the first day had written: “Both my divisional generals and brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralised by shrapnel fire to which they have been subjected all day…numbers have dribbled back from the firing line and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even [the] New Zealand Brigade which has only recently been engaged has lost heavily and is to some extent demoralised. If troops are subjected to shellfire again tomorrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco, as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in the firing line.”

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202 PRO WO 95/4263
203 Corbett, *Naval Operations* Vol II p323

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And in the ANZAC Corps report to MEFHQ there is this:

"...Almost immediately after the troops landed, we were subjected to heavy shrapnel fire, which continued practically throughout the day and to which we were unable to reply" 205.

Godley commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division wrote: "the enemies shrapnel fire was very severe, with the result that a good many of the men who, of course, had never experienced anything of the kind before, were shaken by it, and some broke, and looked like coming in. It was a very high trial for men who had never been in action before to be suddenly subject to a storm of shrapnel, and no reply to it on our side, as the naval guns had not yet been able to locate their targets, and could not tell where our men or the enemy were, and none of our guns were ashore. Things looked very ugly for a bit, and we were glad when night came. It was then a question of whether we could stick it out, as the men who had been ashore all day fighting were very much exhausted, and also unquestionably shaken" 206.

The 8th Battalion war diary noted: "during the day we were subjected to a very accurate and searching artillery fire which inflicted considerable loss" 207.

Four days after the landing, Birdwood, a great admirer of Australian and New Zealand soldiers lest it be thought otherwise, wrote in a private letter: "My troops had bitten off rather more than they could chew...the men had done magnificently ... but then they had shot their bolt and the most awful reaction followed" 208.

Private Robert Grant is the most succinct of all in his diary; "rifles against artillery-literal hell-fighting all day-tired beyond words-thank god for night" 209.

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204 The original signal may be seen in Hamilton’s papers 5/10 in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College, London
205 Report of 8th May ANZAC Corps HQ to Braithwaite Australian War Memorial 419/10/7
206 Godley’s letter to Wigram CAB 19/29/52
207 Australian War Memorial 4 23/211,2 and 3.
208 Australian War Memorial 3drl1731 419/10/7
209 Grant, unpublished diary Australian War Memorial 89/15/45

79
That many ANZAC soldiers left the firing line and returned to the beach as a result of this severe baptism of fire is testified to by many witnesses. This had begun at least as early as 1320 when the adjutant of 5th Battalion saw “a large number of men with some officers came back in disorder, they had...been enfiladed by shrapnel and machine gun fire” 210. And at 1630, Colonel Plugge of the Auckland Battalion near Baby 700 reported that the firing line retired on him shouting “get to beggary, the Turks are coming on, thousands of them” 211.

Butler, of 9th Battalion, working on the beach reported, "at 3-4 pm there was a nasty rush backwards of men and a rumour the whole line was falling back" 212. As we are here concerned with the effect of the Ottoman bombardment and soon to assess the strength of the ANZAC Corps firing line during the main counter attack the question of how many did return to the beach is relevant.

Captain Shout said after the main counterattack he organised a group of 200 stragglers and took them back to the firing line 213. Dawkins, an engineer officer on the beach most of day reported seeing hundreds of stragglers there 214. "As night went on a great number of these stragglers were organised into parties to carry water, ammunition and food up to the lines. I have heard their number put at anything from 600 to 1000. Many of them came down with a wounded man. The men now realise that it is not right to leave the firing line. They were raw soldiers that first day" 215. When Admiral Thursby arrived on the beach at midnight he noted it was still crammed with men though presumably not all were stragglers from the line.

It is likely as many as one thousand of the perhaps eight thousand unwounded in the line by the late afternoon had retired from it especially when one considers that if it

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210 Australian War Memorial 41 9/99/2
211 Bean diaries and notes Australian War Memorial 38 drl 1722 item 2
212 Australian War Memorial 38 3drl 606, item 24
213 During the main counter attack Shout reports he gathered two hundred men from all battalions and led them back to the line about Baby 700. Bean, Official History p 318. See also Admiral Thursby’s papers NMM, Dardanelles folder box 2
214 Ingle J, A Biography of Lt. William Henry Dawkins p 156
215 Bean, Gallipoli Diary p74
was not quite that number on the beach the terrain allowed for many other recesses behind the line into which to withdraw unobserved\textsuperscript{216}.

In part those who left the line and spread the rumour of a general withdrawal did so because of inexperience. Dawson has already made mention of this and in a letter to Charles Bean, Lt E.E Herrod of the 2nd Battalion discusses this point in response to a question posed by Bean:

"I agree most decidedly with the "demoralisation"...My experience from that day, till our last action" [the end of the war] was that if one took notice of the stragglers and the recently wounded, one would certainly think that things had gone to pieces...We only learned by experience and got to know how much reliance to place on (a) wounded man's statement, and it became easy later on as we had studied the psychology of our man, but on the day of the landing it was not so I fear". Herrod also said "a retirement was actually started on Sunday night ...and Walkers Ridge was left without a single defender for perhaps half an hour" \textsuperscript{217}.

\textbf{PHYSICAL EFFECT}

Having established the morale effect of the Ottoman bombardment what then was the physical effect of this fire on the ANZAC line on second ridge? The troops there were lying down concealed somewhat by the low scrub and without the benefit of trenches which would have much lessened the effects of the bombardment. Some provision had been made to get useful implements to the front line for there is a photograph taken on the first day showing some men advancing over Plugges with spades on their packs, but most did not have any \textsuperscript{218}. The following is representative:

"Towards sundown we tried to dig ourselves into [the] gravelly ground with the aid of an entrenching tool, no shovels or spades or tools of any description being

\textsuperscript{216} Ingle \textit{ibid} p157
\textsuperscript{217} Australian War Memorial 38 series 5 drl8042 item 5
\textsuperscript{218} Bean, \textit{Official History}, between pp 302 and 303
available to us and throwing up what little bit of soil we could in front of us to give a little bit of cover” 219.

Information on the kinds of wounds sustained by casualties evacuated was not recorded on 25 April. What can be done is to estimate the overall casualties and argue most were caused by the bombardment. Some detail is required here as the generally accepted casualty figure appears to be in error. This appears in both the Australian and British official histories and is about 2000 for the entire Corps on the first day 220. Bean records “by midnight it was realized that some 1200 men had passed through the [clearing] station and the total loss was put at 2000” 221. The British Official History too gives this figure and it has been retained ever since. Denis Winter is the only writer to have taken issue with it 222.

The figure of 2000 was assessed late on the day of the landing when it cannot have been known with accuracy owing to the confusion attendant to any battle. The situation on the beach was described as an administrative shambles by one witness. Five days later it was possible to calculate casualties with much more accuracy and it is from the figures of casualties from 25 to 30 April that it becomes apparent casualties were more severe on the first day than has previously been believed.

A report on the performance of medical arrangements reveals there were four ways a wounded man may have left the peninsula in the period 25 to 30 April - The 1st Australian Clearing Station, the New Zealand Field Ambulance, the Royal Naval Division Field Ambulance and those “evacuated irregularly or unrecorded”. The total given is 5236. A rule of thumb in the Great War was one killed to every four wounded. However the ratio for all Australian and New Zealand casualties for the whole campaign is 1 to 3.35 223. It seems reasonable to use this ratio for the British Official History gives quite similar numbers, 1 to 3, as the overall ratio of killed to wounded for British soldiers. 224 Also the medical arrangements for the first day are known to have been inadequate. One effect of this would have been an increased

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219 Private Blaskett in Steel and Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli p 73
220 Aspinall Oglander, Military Operations, Gallipoli p 199 and Bean, Official History p 566
221 Bean, Official History p 566
222 Winter, April 25th, The Inevitable Tragedy pp 229-230
223 Bean, Official History Vol II p 909

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ratio of fatal wounds owing to a longer period of time elapsing between an individual being wounded and receiving medical attention. At this ratio there would be 1562 dead to set alongside the 5236 wounded giving a total casualty figure for the first six days of about 6800.

The second important piece of evidence concerns the roll calls made of First Australian Division up to noon 30 April. This shows 5011 casualties (killed and wounded) in that division alone 225. No record of casualties for the New Zealand and Australian Division was made at the same time. As this division was two-thirds the size of the First Australian Division a figure of 3300 for the former might at first sight seem reasonable. This would suggest over 8000 casualties for the Corps in the first six days. However the New Zealand and Australian Division was less intensively engaged on the first day when most of these casualties were inflicted—two battalions were still not landed by midnight. To err on the side of caution we will then assume a figure about half that of the First Australian Division giving 7500 for the Corps. This is 700 more than the figure given in the medical report for the same period of six days.

Thirdly Denis Winter looks at the casualty issue in depth and narrates an after the war casualty controversy between the British and Australian authorities. The figure eventually settled on was 8570 casualties for the first six days on the front of the ANZAC Corps 226. Winter is clearly including casualties from all other units present, the largest of which was the Royal Naval Division.

Estimates then vary between 6800 and 8570 for the period in question. To be again cautious and to allow for the several hundred casualties inflicted on the Royal Naval Division and other formations not part of the ANZAC Corps from the night of 28 April to 30 a figure of 7000 will be adopted for the purposes of the following argument 227. The problem now is to assess what proportion of these were casualties inflicted on the first day. If there were only 2000 casualties on the first day this

224 MacPherson, Official History of the War, Medical Services, p 31
225 Bean, Official History, Vol I p 536-7
226 Winter, April 25th, The Inevitable Tragedy p229
227 Less than 4000 non ANZAC Corps soldiers were landed up to 1st May. Bean, Official History p 281
figure suggests there were an average of almost 1000 a day for the following five days. This is very unlikely to have been the case and it is necessary to briefly examine the events of those days to see why.

On 26 April, the 4th battalion made an unauthorized and disastrous advance that cost it 200 men. There was also quite a lot of jockeying for position along the rest of the line in a series of company or battalion sized fights and a bombardment by the Ottoman guns. Less than 1000 wounded were evacuated on this day and many of these were wounded the day before. One thousand casualties seems then a fair estimate for the day. On the 27th the Ottoman forces launched a serious but soundly defeated attack that can hardly have cost the defenders more than the greatest of Ottoman attacks in the campaign, that of 19 May. No casualty precise figures are available but the attack of 27 April was launched by a force less than half the strength of that which attacked on 19 May losing 10,000 men and inflicting 500 casualties on the ANZAC Corps. It does not seem likely the defenders' casualties on the 27th would have been more than this. One would have to suspend belief to suppose that casualties on the comparatively quiet days of 28th to 30 April were anywhere near half those of the first day. Moreover all brigades of the corps were pulled out of the line at some time in this period, relieved in part by a brigade strength force of the Royal Naval Division, from 28 to 30 April.

Further evidence for this view comes from the casualty figures for the 1st Australian Clearing Station. On 26 April it evacuated 700, the next day 659 then 398 for 28th. There is no figure for 29th and 199 were evacuated on the 30th. While this unit was not the only one evacuating wounded the evidence here is a clear indication casualties for these days were much less than those for 25th.

If we assume 1000 casualties for 26th and 500 each for the 27th to 30 April we are left with a figure for 25 April of something like 4000 casualties or twice that which has been generally accepted. It is surprising that 2000 should still be the generally accepted figure for documents written on the day or soon after indicate casualties were considerably higher than 2000 for the ANZAC Corps.

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228 Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-1918, Vol I pp 146-148
At 1630 on 25 April a report reached Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ from ANZAC Corps saying casualties were about 2000 already and this must be a number estimated before the main counterattack. On 4th May Birdwood wrote to Kitchener “my losses on the 25th were roughly 500 killed, 2500 wounded and 2000 missing”. A proportion of the missing would have been intact but separated from their unit. This by the ANZAC Corps commander is more likely to be closer to the truth than the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force commander’s estimate on 11 May that he had lost 5000 on the first day for this figure includes the Cape Helles landing but probably is not meant to include the French casualties at their landing at Kum Kale. In any case as it was well known that casualties at ANZAC were in excess of those at Cape Helles for this period so it at least indicates he was aware casualties were higher than the estimates made on the day of the landing.

The evidence is about 4000 casualties were inflicted on the Corps on the first day or 30 per cent of those engaged up until the main counterattack was repulsed. As ten per cent of those who landed on the first day were not in the rifle battalions who took the major share of the casualties the percentage is likely higher. Now what are the grounds for believing most of these were caused by the Ottoman artillery bombardment?

Again we have no reliable figures. Through the day estimates of casualties were passed up through the chain of command. The first was 200 casualties in the early morning. Presumably this was before the debacle in front of Fisherman’s Hut was known. There 140 men of the 7th battalion in four boats landed in error and over 100 were shot down by machine gun fire before they could get ashore. We also know a hospital ship catering for 450 casualties was full at 8 am and had sailed for Alexandria. The next estimate passed to Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ was 700 a “few hours later” presumably before casualties from the first counterattack were known. On this admittedly slim evidence ANZAC Corps had

229 ibid
230 PRO WO 95/4263
231 PRO 30/57/61
232 PRO 30/57/61
233 Bean, Official History p281
sustained perhaps 1000 casualties by midday and it has already been established about 4000 by nightfall. At this point it will at least be granted the majority of casualties were inflicted after the commencement of the bombardment preparatory to the main counterattack.

Another reason to suppose the casualties were primarily inflicted by artillery is from the time of the halting of the ANZAC advance at about 0700 there were very few movements of large formations of the ANZAC Corps as the Corps had 'gone to ground.' Rifles and machine guns are not nearly as effective when firing upon prone targets. Personal diaries often remark upon the way in which everyone seemed to disappear when movement ceased and all were prone in the one to two metre high scrub that covered almost all of the battlefield as it does today. One soldier, who spent most of the day near Wire Gully, most definitely in the front line, reported he saw no enemy at all on 25 April 235. Artillery firing shrapnel is not so disadvantaged by these circumstances as the shell bursts over the target and propels its effect downward.

We also know there were some remarkable cases of the effectiveness of this artillery fire. The Otago battalion lost 30 men to artillery fire in 15 minutes from 1745 to 1800 236. Whether or not this was a rare event cannot be known.

Writers on the subject have not been in agreement about the quality of the opposition to the ANZAC Corps on 25 April. This is the theme that forms the fourth part of this thesis but for now it is sufficient to point out in support of the present proposition that The Handbook of the Turkish Army, issued to at least the senior officers of the ANZAC Corps and dated 1 March 1915 relates that the Ottoman Artillery is their most efficient arm and "approximates very nearly to the ordinary continental standard of efficiency and is the best trained arm of the three [infantry, cavalry and artillery]" 237.

234 ibid p 566
235 Australian War Memorial 12/11/2853 1 drr 608
236 Australian War Memorial ormf 0088, roll 153
237 Handbook of the Turkish Army P 95
In the Great War 70 per cent of all casualties were to artillery fire. There is no particular reason to suppose it was otherwise in the Battle of Second Ridge. If 1000 casualties were inflicted on the Corps prior to the commencement of the bombardment then 3000 casualties were inflicted after. Looking at the frontage, strength and duration of the main counter attack of 25 April and comparing it to the attacks on 27 April and 19 May of which we have more reliable statistics it is improbable it inflicted more than 1000 casualties. This is especially so when we consider that it failed to take very much ground - that of Baby 700 being its most important success. It seems then reasonable to suppose that well over half the casualties suffered by the ANZAC Corps on the day of the landing were inflicted by shrapnel “well burst, ten or fifteen feet above the ground” 238.

THE THIRD PHASE-THE OTTOMAN COUNTERATTACK 1600-2000

How strong was the counter attack and how strong were the defenders for this, the main Ottoman effort of the day? By 1600 all of the 1st Australian Division, one and a half battalions of the New Zealand brigade and none of the 4th Australian brigade were ashore. This would give a total of 13 and a half battalions or 12,000 rifles. The only reserve, 4th Battalion was near the beach. The 900 rifles it represented were committed in the course of the counterattack. Up to 4000 more rifles were accounted for by casualties and those who had left the firing line. There were probably then 7000 rifles – definitely no more than 8000- holding a total front of seven kilometres. With them were 30 machine guns. There was no artillery in support. The Indian Army mountain battery which had provided some support in the early afternoon had been shot out of the line by Ottoman counter battery fire. Neither a second mountain battery nor any Corps field artillery had as yet landed 239.

It should be noted this was a most inadequate force for the frontage to be held. The British Field Regulations Manual on which all British Empire troops based their training laid down that this size force should not be expected to hold more than half

238 Bean, Official History 309
that frontage. Later in the campaign ANZAC Corps staff estimated their front was safely held with an average of two and a half rifles per yard or more than double what was available on the afternoon of the first day.

The front must be divided into five parts in order to easily understand what follows. On the ANZAC left on the low ground south of Fisherman's Hut were 500 men facing the Ottoman infantry company and a pair of machine guns who had held that front all day. The left centre held 500 men at least half of whom were New Zealanders. This is the area encompassed by Russell's Top, Walkers Ridge the Nek and Baby 700. In the centre along the narrow part of Second Ridge in the area soon to contain Quinn's, Courtney's and Steel's posts were another 1500 and on 400 Plateau, next on the right were 3500 men mainly of 2nd Brigade. On the far right were the men of 8th Battalion on Bolton's Ridge and elements of 6th Battalion and other small parties, another 1000 in all. The vital ground was Baby 700 for an observer here could direct fire down Monash and Shrapnel Gullies into the heart of the ANZAC position. The second most important piece of ground was at 400 Plateau. It will immediately be seen the position on 400 Plateau was the strongest in the line and that on Baby 700 comparatively weakly held given its importance. Sinclair-Maclagan and later Bridges were fully aware of its vital nature. Their attempts to reinforce it were constantly thwarted by the tendency of files of soldiers directed up Monash Gully, the only covered approach to Baby 700, becoming lost or being drawn into fighting along the narrow central part of Second Ridge.

What was the strength of the opposing force? Poised to attack the ANZAC Corps position were ten battalions of infantry, remnants of an eleventh that had originally held the coast by Ari Burnu and several hundred dismounted cavalry. This is a force no more than 10,500 strong. Allowing for casualties perhaps 8500 were present at this time. It was supported by more than 20 machine guns and 41 pieces of field, mountain and heavy howitzer artillery.

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239 ibid p 286
240 General Staff, Field Service Regulations, Ch VII, Section 104
241 Bean, Official History pp 410-424
242 The 2/27 regiments were defending the coast and 19th and 9th divisions had a squadron of cavalry each.
The casualties suffered by the Ottoman forces were almost entirely from the 57th and 27th Regiments who had made the first counterattack in the early morning. Of 5 battalions 5000 strong 4 had been fully committed to the fighting. Judging by the ferocity of the fighting and the fact that they were both still able to mount serious attacks in the afternoon a figure of 1500 casualties would not be too far from the mark. These two regiments lost 50% casualties in the whole day’s fighting. When we add 500 for the losses of the battalion originally defending the beaches a figure of 2000 Ottoman casualties up to 1600 seems reasonable.

The counterattack can best be viewed by looking at the movements of each of the four Ottoman regiments involved. We will examine first the most important, the attack on Baby 700. 57th Regiment had two battalions hard used in the morning and one fresh battalion. One additional battalion from the 72nd Regiment was brought up by Kemal to strengthen this attack but was not committed until after dark. Thus about 2500 riflemen, supported by two batteries of artillery and one or two machine gun companies assaulted a position held by 500 men of the ANZAC Corps. They stormed over their first objective Baby 700 after 4.30 but did not proceed on to the Nek until after dark at 7.0’clock. They made no great further effort to advance though it is doubtful if the less than 100 New Zealanders and Australians at the Nek, even with the support of Major Braund’s two companies holding solidly on Walkers Ridge in support, would have held them. This seems strange but there are several possible explanations. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of 57th Regiment may well have suffered so heavily that they made little contribution to the attack and the battalion of 72nd Regiment may have made no contribution until 1900 by which time baby 700 had fallen. So it is arguable the defenders of Baby 700 were overwhelmed by one strong battalion with artillery support and the later, lesser effort made at the Nek after dark was the contribution of the battalion of the 72nd Regiment. Either way the attack which might have proceeded to Russell’s Top in

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243 Bean, Gallipoli Mission p 352
244 Few units can take half casualties and carry on and a serious fight such as occurred in the morning would have certainly caused more than 20 per cent casualties. So settling on a figure of 30% for four battalions engaged gives about 1500 casualties.
245 Extreme right hand of this attack was involved in fighting as far down as Fisherman’s Hut
According to the Australian Official History the 77th Regiment attacked to the left of the 57th, between it and 27th Regiment towards the narrow part of Second Ridge and the remaining battalions of 72nd Regiment were also committed in this direction after dark. The modern Turkish Official History gives a different account: The 77th, two battalions strong was brought in on the left of 27th Regiment and made an attack towards Bolton’s Ridge and the southern part of 400 Plateau about 1700. Pine Ridge, a finger extending south from 400 Plateau in front of and parallel to Bolton’s was the prize seized. 27th Regiment supported this attack on the right of 77th Regiment.

The Turkish account is more likely accurate for several reasons. First if we are able, with the dispersion of the ANZAC Corps by companies on the first day, to work out where most units were then there is no reason to believe Turkish historians cannot do the same for a force which was considerably less disorganised. The 77th Regiment was not involved in the day’s activities until it attacked late in the day and waited as a body on Palamutluk ridge until it was committed. This ridge is just south east of Bolton’s so the regiment would have had to cross the rear of the Ottoman position in order to attack towards the ANZAC left centre. The regiment had spent the afternoon on Palamutluk ridge so there was ample time to have performed such a manoeuvre had it been part of the plan. More likely it was left facing the position it was intended to assault until the time was judged to be right.

Thirdly the attack on the southern part of the ANZAC position was manifestly so serious the 4th Battalion, the sole remaining reserve, was committed there to counter it. There were 4000 rifles deployed on and to the (ANZAC) right of the northern end of 400 Plateau. It is hard to believe they could have been so seriously threatened by the two already battered battalions of 27th Regiment who were the only other Ottoman troops on that flank if the 77th was elsewhere. The 27th had

246 Bean, Official History pp 315-321
247 The 3rd battalion of this regiment was the one sent to Suvla and probably took no part in fighting
248 Turkish Official History Vol II p 114
taken considerable casualties in the morning and were probably not stronger than 1500 rifles. This plus the 2000 fresh men of the 77th Regiment together with supporting artillery and machine guns is a more plausible force both to prompt the commitment of the Corps reserve (4th battalion) and to make such a dent in the ANZAC line.

Bean’s error if it is one, arose from his interview with Zeki Bey who gives the deployment Bean used. Zeki had left Bighali in the early morning with Kemal and stayed on the right of the Ottoman line. He was wounded in the fighting on Battleship Hill and was not present when the 77th Regiment made its attack. He is a useful informant but this is not the only error in his account.

The remaining two battalions of the 72nd Regiment arrived at nightfall on Battleship Hill and were used to reinforce the line thereabouts. They assaulted across the Nek to Russell’s Top about 1900. They were ejected from there the following day.

To summarize the third phase of the battle represents the Ottoman effort to capitalize on the effect of the afternoon’s bombardment of the enemy position. Two major attacks were made. One in great strength compared to that of the defender, seized Baby 700 and one to the south where the defenders were stronger than the attackers, failed to more than seize a relatively unimportant part of the ANZAC line.

Moreover it would have been a very odd deployment for Kemal to so heavily weigh his right with three of his four regiments on ground where deployment was difficult and leave only a weakened fourth (two battalion) regiment to hold his entire center and left.
CHAPTER FIVE. THE ARMIES
CHAPTER 5. THE ARMIES

INTRODUCTION

The following section assesses broad characteristics of the ANZAC and Ottoman contenders which, while discussed in detail in preceding sections, also need to be considered in the overall context of the Dardanelles Campaign to properly explain the events of the day on 25 April 1915. This cannot easily be done for the whole day as conditions varied considerably. Most importantly in the early morning the ANZACs were the attackers but for the rest of the day they defended. The natural advantages accruing to the defender in modern war are so great as to very much alter the relative importance of the factors under consideration. For this reason the time of the main Ottoman counterattack in the late afternoon will be our focus.

This line of inquiry is really then an attempt to quantify the relative strengths of the opposing forces. This has not been done before. Examining the relative strengths of the Ottoman forces and the ANZAC Corps is important because if it can be shown that the strength of the counter attack was greater by a proportion that should have resulted in success, then credit should be given to the latter for their successful defence. If, on the other hand, the ANZAC Corps had significantly greater combat effectiveness at this the worst time of the day for them, then those who assert not enough was accomplished by the Corps on 25 April will find their position stronger.

There is a body of opinion that claims it is not possible to precisely quantify combat effectiveness. Among its opponents is Trevor Dupuy who in Numbers, Prediction and War outlines a method for assessing combat effectiveness by allocating a numerical factor to the variables in a battle. The strength, morale and leadership of the armies are assessed together with their equipment, training and the circumstances of the combat. When applied to the case under study this system of analysis was found to be unsatisfactory and the present writer has opted instead for a less mathematical but hopefully more believable approach. This thesis will then utilise the following tools to assess the strengths of the opponents: infantry strength,
machine gun strength, artillery strength, naval gunfire support, supply; training; experience; command; terrain as it affected the tactical situation and morale.

As has been seen there is less difficulty obtaining an accurate Order of Battle for the ANZAC Corps than for their opponents. While the documents of 85 years ago in Ottoman Script are difficult to translate, hard to obtain permission to view and far from comprehensive, excellent work has been done by modern Turkish historians.

INFANTRY

The strength of the ANZAC Corps landed in time to contribute to the battle up to the time the main counterattack had failed (2000) was 12,000 rifles. Of these 7-8,000 rifles were available to defend against the counterattack. Against this 8500 rifles were available to the attacker. The ANZAC infantry battalions had followed the British procedure of the time and kept about 10 per cent of each out of battle and landed about 900 strong. Their opponents’ infantry battalions were in the main at very close to full strength of 1081 men. It is also possible the Ottoman numbers were even stronger as two battalions not so far mentioned were manoeuvring in the vicinity of the battle on the day and there is some evidence at least elements of these participated in the fight. The present writer has been unable to discover the truth in this matter. There is also evidence that working parties of riflemen from the ANZAC Corps to the strength of 450 men were retained on the beach to unload supplies. It cannot be determined where they came

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250 Murphy, Soldiers of the Prophet p176 ff for an assessment of the Ottoman Army and a detailed order of battle.
251 The Australian battalions of the ANZAC Corps had a machine gun section of fifteen men and two guns per battalion. These landed with their battalions including the first wave. The New Zealand battalions had 4 machine guns each.
252 The Turkish Official History (Vol II p 142) gives 13008 for the strength of 19th Division on 25 April. Excluding attached units and allowing for machine gunners, artillery and non-combatants it would seem the nine infantry battalions were at full strength of 1000 men. 9th division was even stronger at 14336.
253 In fact not all 900 were riflemen but as a similar number in Ottoman battalions would be other than riflemen I have retained this figure. Basically the Ottoman battalions were about ten per cent stronger than the ANZAC battalions.
254 Kaizim Pasha told Bean there were only 4000 rifles in 57th and 27th regiments but the detailed analysis of the figures of the Turkish official history is more likely to be accurate.
255 There is one report of the Corps being attacked by soldiers in blue uniforms. A blue grey was the garb of the Broussa Gendarmes who were this day marching from Suvla across the rear of the battle towards Kilid Bahr. It is possible at least some became involved in the fighting on the ANZAC extreme left. In Bean, Gallipoli Mission, p 93
from and may have been stragglers from the line for whom we have already made a deduction.

As to rifle strength then the two sides were roughly equal. It was held that one rifleman in a good position could hope to successfully defend against up to six attacking him on open ground if no other factor intervened. This would suggest that considering infantry strength alone with a rough equivalence of rifles the ANZAC Corps, in the afternoon, had the advantage.

MACHINE GUNS

The number of machine guns present is even more difficult to assess than artillery. All that can be said is that each Australian battalion landed with two and each New Zealand battalion with four giving at most 32 if the one and a half New Zealand battalions landed in time to participate in the defence before dark brought ashore their full compliment. Each of the four Ottoman regiments present had a machine gun company of four weapons and six more were in position at the start at Fisherman’s Hut, Russell’s Top and Gaba Tepe giving 22 in all.

In early 1915 the use of massed machine guns in a kind of bombardment preparatory to an attack had not yet been tried. As a consequence the Ottoman machine guns would have been restricted to giving covering fire to their attacking infantry on parts of the ANZAC line not assaulted and as such would have been of far less use than the machineguns of the defender. There are in Bean’s notes as numerous mentions of the efficacy of defensive machine gun fire as there are lamentations that no machine guns had yet come up in the commentator’s particular part of the line. One wonders whether all 32 were available and whether they found suitable positions in terrain often lacking good fields of fire.

The firepower of a tripod mounted heavy machine gun was assessed in the early part of this century to be worth between 100 and 200 riflemen depending upon tactical circumstances. A machine gun company (four guns) would then have the

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256 Bean, Official History p 408
firepower of a half battalion of riflemen. If most of the ANZAC Corps machine guns were in a position to contribute to the defence and using this yardstick we may add a half again to the firepower available for the defence. The Ottoman machine guns cannot have been anywhere near as useful to them once they had gone over to the attack.

ARTILLERY

As regards artillery, it was realised at the time by the participants that attacks without great artillery support were pointless. This was the central lesson eight months of war had taught. It is however much more difficult to assess the value of artillery firepower than that of machine guns. Provided the artillery has suitable targets that are not well dug in, an artillery battery, partly on account of its much longer range, must be worth at least that of a machine gun company. Of course these two weapons perform quite different functions but any attempt to assess the combat effectiveness of the contenders must also make a comparison of weapons effectiveness while bearing in mind it is the combination of arms on the battlefield that is the key to success: Artillery without infantry cannot protect itself just as infantry without artillery (as was the case of the ANZAC Corps through most of the day) cannot advance. If it can be said a machine gun company, at least in defence, is worth half a rifle battalion and an artillery battery is worth more than this then the 41 pieces available to the Ottomans represent something approaching a doubling of their firepower as it bears on combat effectiveness.

The view that the single greatest contribution to Ottoman combat effectiveness was made by their artillery is in any case supported by much that has gone before. It has been argued that it was the artillery that ensured the ANZAC Corps could not manoeuvre; it inflicted the majority of casualties and its preparatory bombardment made possible the main counterattack.

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257 A close reading of Bean’s Official History chapters 12 to 19 provides this estimate
258 ANZAC Corps machine guns were not organized into companies. Two were allocated to each Australian battalion and four to each New Zealand battalion.
259 See Bailey J Field Artillery and Firepower, Ch 14 for a discussion on the combat effectiveness of Great War artillery.
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

The Chief of Staff of the Ottoman 5th Army under whom were the 9th and 19th Divisions who fought the ANZAC Corps was of the opinion the effect of naval gunfire on this occasion was “morale but not material” 260. This view is not disputed by other witnesses. On the contrary it was the generally expressed view before, during and after the day that naval guns supporting infantry “were generally useless” 261. This was not because preparations were not made: Vice Admiral J.M de Robeck, Commanding Eastern Mediterranean Squadron issued a memorandum on 12 April on naval gunfire support in which he ordered “fire from covering ships is to be used to assist operations...the primary objective being the enemy’s artillery. The attack on the enemy’s artillery will as a rule be best directed against personnel with shrapnel...ships will generally fire whenever the enemy’s troops are observed or for a definite tactical objective...they are always to do so, on any objective indicated by the military” 262.

This sounds reassuring but De Robeck in a private letter said before the event he thought the opinion of the War Office as to the support the fleet could offer the army was too sanguine 263. He wrote, “The Turkish troops have not much to fear from the flat trajectory guns of the navy” 264.

On the day it was recorded by a Royal Naval Air Service observer spotting for the HMS Triumph bombarding the camp of 27th Regiment near Mados that the (firing) ships “were lying so close in under Sari Bair mountain that objectives close behind the mountain could not be reached by any gun with a moderately flat trajectory” 265.

Officials at the Public Record Office in London report the relevant Royal Navy gunnery logs were destroyed over 70 years ago. Anyone curious enough about the effects of the naval bombardment to examine the next best authority, the ships logs,

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260 Bean, Gallipoli Mission, appendix I
261 For a general discussion and numerous quotes to this effect see Ellison, NAM 8704/35/324
262 PRO W0/106/705 and Flights and Fights Samson (p 234) says his signals to the ships he was spotting for at Cape Helles on 25 April were generally ignored.
263 NAM 8704-35-330,11245
265 Strain diary, vol 2 p28
will first be impressed by how little firing was done. There were five battleships, one cruiser and eight destroyers present with Rear Admiral Thursby's Second naval Squadron \(^{266}\). *HMS Queen Elizabeth*, the flagship was also present for a time but did not fire. Nor did any of the destroyers who were busy landing the troops. The cruiser Bacchante was reported to have destroyed the guns on Gaba Tepe but in fact managed only to silence them for periods in the course of the day \(^{267}\). This is one of only two events for which we have reasonable evidence for the naval bombardment materially assisted the ANZAC Corps.

The gunnery logs would also have given the kind of shell fired. Shrapnel would have been the most effective but ships did not customarily carry many of these as their main task was to fire on other ships. At the Suvla landing in August we know some ships carried only six rounds of shrapnel \(^{268}\). As the ships sent to the Dardanelles in February were intended to bombard forts, not troops in the open, and had no chance to ream with more desirable projectiles it is not likely they would have had a much larger supply at the landings in April.

Of the battleships *HMS Majestic* fired for 57 minutes with 6 inch guns plus the period from 1456 to 1728 when it “fired at intervals” \(^{269}\). *HMS Prince of Wales* log claims she opened fire at 0400 which cannot be true as there was no firing from the sea until the boats were first fired on from the land. More likely this ship opened fire at 0530, by which time there was enough light, and ceased at 0630 \(^{270}\). From 1400 she “fired at intervals” and opened up again at 1855 until 1930. From *HMS Queen* all we know is she fired at 0600 and at 1100 was “firing as required” \(^{271}\). *HMS Triumph* fired on thirteen occasions for a total period of perhaps two hours. We cannot be sure of the details as ships logs did not always record much detail about firing or targets. On one of these occasions the shells were seen to fall among the

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\(^{266}\) Puleston, The Dardanelles Expedition, p 65

\(^{267}\) *HMS Bacchante* did most of the firing on Gaba Tepe from short range at 0515-0715 and 1000. See ships log PRO ADM 53/34645

*HMS Queen Elizabeth* didn’t fire while at ANZAC on 25 April though in Strains diary he says it does. He is confusing 25th with 26th. Ship log PRO 53/56824

\(^{268}\) PRO CAB 19/32 and 8/9/17 “each ship had 6 rounds of shrapnel per gun...*HMS Vengeance* had a special allowance of shrapnel at Suvla”

\(^{269}\) PRO ADM 53/47972

\(^{270}\) PRO ADM 53/55828

\(^{271}\) PRO ADM 53/56781
77th Regiment as it advanced from the southern end of Third Ridge to attack Pine Ridge. It is not known how effective this was but it is the second of the events where we can be sure the naval bombardment made a contribution. It did not stop the attack. Apart from the area about Fisherman’s Hut this is the only part of the beachhead where one can see any distance inland from offshore. Of HMS London all we know is she “opened fire at frequent intervals”\textsuperscript{272}. Nor is there evidence of how many rounds were fired off Ari Burnu though some is available for the Cape Helles landing \textsuperscript{273}.

After the event the consensus view was “the navy have not been able to give the army as great assistance as was anticipated. The navy is of small assistance when it is a matter of trenches and machine guns” \textsuperscript{274}. More forthright are the following comments made after the landing by witnesses ashore and afloat: “Naval guns, when directed against shore targets are spectacular but unconvincing” and “naval guns are of very little use in support of an infantry attack” \textsuperscript{275}.

It is possible naval gunfire support was more effective than here indicated. Perhaps the moral effect referred to by Kaizim Pasha was significant. It is interesting to speculate on the panic that is said to have suddenly occurred among one of the battalions of the 77th Regiment. This is the only regiment we know for sure took casualties to fire from the sea. If further investigation showed this to be so then the present argument might need to be revisited. As it is Bean reported that by 1600, when most needed the naval guns “had almost ceased to fire” \textsuperscript{276}.

**SUPPLY**

As we are only examining the influence of supply on the first days fighting, not all supply considerations need be taken into account. As long as both sides had

\textsuperscript{272} PRO ADM 53
\textsuperscript{273} PRO CAB 19/32
\textsuperscript{274} Admiral Thursby’s papers, NMM M 586/012, 19th May report to Admiralty
\textsuperscript{275} The quotes from witnesses present collected in letter by Sir Maurice Hankey. Ellison papers NAM 8704-35-330. Bean also says “Naval artillery being of little use against such targets as the day offered, could not support the troops, and had almost ceased to fire” at the time of main Ottoman counter attack Bean, Official History p 314-315
\textsuperscript{276} Bean ibid 314-315
adequate water and ammunition, they could be considered just sufficiently well supplied for the purposes of one day's fighting. British intelligence had noted that the Ottoman camps behind the intended landing area had many wells. Indeed, this is one of the criteria for a suitable location for a camp for large numbers of troops in the long term. Birdwood was also aware this would be a problem for his Corps:

"The hill I have to take is about the most waterless piece of the peninsula...and I am assured that without water they [the troops] may cause great difficulties." 277

He goes on to discuss how his preparations to solve this problem had somehow been dropped from the plan by Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ.

All water and ammunition for the ANZACs on Second Ridge had to be brought from the beach, carried over rough ground and delivered under fire. Delivery of water to the front line was possible in only a few cases and many of the troops who came down to the beach in the evening were in search of water. While there are examples of good water discipline, many soldiers entirely consumed their supply by early afternoon.

In contrast Ottoman supplies came to the front line over better country with the aid of transport companies from dumps and water supplies nearby 278.

The commander of the 5th Army General Liman von Sanders was of the opinion that "infantry ammunition was available in sufficient quantities" and this is supported by Hans Kannengeiser who attributes the success of the Ottoman troops to an abundance of water and rifle ammunition 279. The two Arab regiments, the 77th and 72nd, were not committed until late in the day. Prior to deployment, they remained on or near their sources of water. The remaining regiments did at least receive some infantry ammunition so as regards supply it seems the Ottoman were better placed than the ANZAC Corps.

277 Birdwood to Fitzgerald PRO 30/57/61
278 Turkish Official History Vol II p 112
Regarding artillery ammunition things are less clear. Sanders and German sources in general claim there was a shortage. On the other hand Australians and New Zealanders present report the bombardment only ceased on dark and we have the report of a prisoner to the effect his battery and another with them had an adequate supply of ammunition.

Owing to the relative ease with which the Ottoman force could be supplied with water and ammunition they had the advantage in the area of supply on 25 April.

TRAINING

In the case of the Ottoman army the effect of the Balkan wars and the reorganisation of the army by German officers both loom large. In 1913 at the end of the Second Balkan war the Ottoman army was in poor shape. A German military mission began the work of reconstructing it along European lines. One who was involved wrote later that the officers "who had graduated from the military academies often were unable to separate theory and practice and adapt themselves to the real situation. Those officers who had risen from the ranks were usually good front soldiers." In general it was thought "the reorganisation of the Turkish Army [after the Balkan Wars] could only be a long term task, quick results could not be expected. This work was suddenly interrupted when Turkey entered the war...[but] In an astonishingly short lapse of time the Turkish Army changed its inward and outward appearance, and was turned at least to a certain degree, into a modern instrument of war, and was at the outbreak of the war, always taking into account its special features and habits, generally fit for fighting European opponents." Thanks to the untiring and extraordinarily efficient work of Liman Von Sanders and the German instructors... the Turkish army was far superior to the one of the Balkan war."

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279 Kannengeiser is speaking generally and referring as much to the landings in August as those in April in Gibson, "Eyeless in Byzantium" p91. See also Sanders, Five Years in Turkey p 99
280 Meullman, Der Kampf um die Dardanellen p 10
281 ibid
282 Poniatowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Osmanischen Reiches p16 and 53
How successful was the German attempt to retrain the Ottoman army is vouched for by its opponents. Mediterranean Expeditionary Force HQ received information to the effect that "the Turkish troops (in the recent fighting in Basra) were well disciplined, well trained and brave. Their machine guns had been well concealed, and were used with great effect, and their trenches were admirably situated" 283.

In his evidence before the Dardanelles Commission, Hamilton confessed "I did not know, to tell you the truth, that the Turks were nearly as good as they turned out to be" 284. Ottoman forces were also observed on 25 April to be well trained. Major J Partridge of 10th Battalion witnessed an Ottoman attack on 400 Plateau and was impressed: "they came up in good order, sections in line at intervals" 285. Dougall also on 400 reported that they could see a brigade of Ottoman forces coming up on their left, presumably the 27th Regiment and forming on the ridge opposite. "They watched them deploy...and remarked that they must be regulars to do it so well. Galasford then spoke to him [Dougall] and expressed concern whether the men [the ANZAC Corps] could stand like regulars" 286.

Now this is the key. Battered as it might have been from the Balkan Wars the Ottoman forces were a regular army of long standing. The ANZAC Corps was not.

It is generally imagined that the ANZAC Corps was not well trained and this is true. The battalions in Australia and New Zealand had received several months training before they left those shores but only began to train in brigade manoeuvres in January 1915 in Egypt. The battalions of the New Army raised in England at about the same time were still judged not to be ready for combat in May of 1915. And when they were placed in the line in France they were not for some time expected to participate in an offensive let alone that most difficult operation of war, the amphibious landing. It must be conceded that the Canadian First Division acquitted itself creditably at the Second Battle of Ypres in April of 1915. It had been formed a

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283 Kitchener to Hamilton, signal number 4109 PRO WO 95/4263
284 Bush, Gallipoli p 153
285 Australian War Memorial 89/12/58 item 1.
286 For a discussion of the fighting qualities of the Ottoman Army see Calwell, The Dardanelles p117
month after the two antipodean divisions but had lost less training time to travel\textsuperscript{287}. Of course placing such untried troops in a defensive posture in a well established front line as in the case of the Canadians is a safer introduction to warfare than a landing on a hostile shore in the dark in an operation of a kind never before attempted.

The 14th Battalion war diary is informative. On 10 October 1070 men were taken over from a depot and allotted to the battalion\textsuperscript{288}. The first company field training was on October 24th and the first battalion field training on December 9\textsuperscript{th}. Opportunities for training in the month of January were lost due to the troops sailing to Egypt and disembarking. The first brigade tactical exercises were not held until 25 March days prior to their movement from camps in Egypt.

Whatever else were the shortcomings of the Ottoman force opposed the ANZAC Corps it was a better trained force, trained to "European standard"\textsuperscript{289}.

**EXPERIENCE**

None of the Ottoman regiments in the battle on Second Ridge had had combat experience in the Great War\textsuperscript{290}. However over three quarters of the officers and half of the other ranks in the Fifth Army had combat experience in the Balkan Wars\textsuperscript{291}. The army was greatly expanded in 1914, many reservists were called to the colours and the other half of the rank and file force were conscripts with about as much training as the volunteers they faced.

The ANZAC Corps was designed to be a force with a large measure of experienced soldiers in it. And so it was. Two thirds of the rank and file in the first contingent which formed the bulk of the Corps had some previous military experience as did 95% of the officers though a far smaller proportion had experience of active service.

\textsuperscript{287} Personal correspondence with Professor T. Travers, Calgary University
\textsuperscript{288} Australian War Memorial 4 23/28
\textsuperscript{289} Murphy, *Soldiers of the Prophet* 95
\textsuperscript{290} Larcher, *Guerre Turque* p37
\textsuperscript{291} Personal correspondence with B Celik of METU, Ankara
The difference then between the two was that many of the Ottoman officers and men of three of the four regiments present on Second Ridge would have gained their experience commanding or serving in the same regiment while in the case of the ANZAC Corps this experience was more in the nature of individual rather than formation experience. On balance then the Ottoman Army can be said to be the more experienced of the two.

COMMAND

It has been fashionable for at least thirty years now to be highly critical of British generalship in the Great War. Sir Ian Hamilton has suffered from this but here is not the place to defend him. We will confine ourselves to an assessment of the commanders in operational control of the ANZAC Corps and their opponents the 9th and 19th Ottoman divisions. Three men are here relevant. Sinclair-Maclagan who commanded the elements of the Corps who had landed until 0800 and Bridges who commanded on shore thereafter. On the other side there is Mustafa Kemal who commanded in effect from early in the day and in fact when his corps commander Essad Pasha handed over control of all Ottoman forces opposing the ANZAC Corps at 1300.

It will be argued that in terms of command the accolade must go to Mustafa Kemal who outgeneralled his opponents. It should first be said that no especial criticism of Sinclair-Maclagan or Bridges is implied. It is rather that quite competent commanders were outperformed by a better one in an advantageous situation.

The central reason for this claim concerns the nature of a reserve on the battlefield so some background will here be necessary. Such is the confusion of battle that a commander often loses control, at least temporarily, of any force he commits to the fighting and his decision to commit his reserve or a portion of it and where or when he commits it, is often the only important decision he can make during a battle to affect its outcome. It is a common military maxim attributed to Napoleon I that victory goes to the commander with the last reserve. This was perhaps particularly

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292 See Robson, The First AIF, A Study in its Recruitment and Bean, Official History ch 3
the case in the Great War that fell between the great increase in the range and effect of firepower in the late nineteenth century and the development of effective means of battlefield communication in the mid twentieth century.

The commander who can put such pressure on the enemy to force him to commit his reserve while keeping his own in hand to put in at the decisive place and time is the superior of the two. In our case the difference, judged by this yardstick is easily seen. Sinclair-Maclagan and Bridges after he took over the reins were, as we have seen, constantly obliged to commit their reserves as soon as they arrived on the beach.

In describing the situation Birdwood wrote "each new lot of troops as they landed had to be pushed off up the hills to where most urgently needed and consequently brigades and regiments soon [became] hopelessly broken up". In contrast Kemal was by midday able to send orders to hold back the 72nd and 77th Regiments in order to have a strong reserve with which to launch a major assault to hopefully drive the ANZAC Corps into the sea. At 1300 he obtained permission to throw in these two regiments but did not do so until 1600. Bridges at best was able to keep one battalion [4th bn] in reserve, the 4th from midday until he was obliged to commit it to stave off the threat to 400 Plateau posed by 77th Regiment around 1600. This left no reserve at all until the next company arrived on the beach. In contrast Kemal was able to keep five of the eleven battalions he controlled out of the battle until he was ready to commit them.

Three of Kemal's command decisions brought about this situation. The first was his opinion that reports of the landing of one battalion were probably false and that if the enemy had landed near Gaba Tepe it warranted a greater response than the one battalion he was instructed by his corps commander to meet it with. He committed one regiment, one machine gun company and one battery of artillery and marched it straight to the heights of Sari Bair. He then used this force to drive back the
ANZAC left from this high ground and managed to retake Battleship Hill. The attack was not however strong enough to continue on to Baby 700 at that time. The commander of the 27th Regiment at Maidos Sami Bey made a similarly rapid decision and immediately marched his force towards Gaba Tepe, along Third Ridge and into the attack at the northern end of 400 Plateau.

These two forces having halted the ANZAC Corps advance, Kemal made his second decision; To gather sufficient artillery for a bombardment, suspend further major attacks and let the bombardment do its work of weakening the enemy prior to the infantry assault. This bombardment would also serve to keep the enemy from manoeuvring. The ANZAC Corps lacked artillery support and could make no reply. This period constitutes the second phase of the battle and during it Kemal redirected the fire of his massed artillery onto the two locations he planned to attack—Baby 700 and 400 Plateau.

The third noteworthy battle decision concerns the main attack. After having given his artillery the maximum amount of time to demoralise the enemy and directing its fire in the main on the two features he hoped to storm, Kemal attacked with about three hours of light remaining in the day. There was just enough time to break through to the beaches. This they narrowly failed to do.

It must be conceded that Mustapha Kemal enjoyed advantages over his opponents one of which was knowledge of the ground. He had first seen it during the Balkan Wars and later while exercising his division over the ground in the month prior to the landing. Nevertheless he managed to seize the initiative and by forcing Bridges to commit his reserves as soon as they arrived Kemal was taking away Bridges ability to win the battle while retaining his own. Bridges might not lose the battle but without a sizeable reserve he could not win it.

Stepping back from the ANZAC front for a moment and looking at broader considerations it will be realised that the involvement of four of the five available Ottoman regiments to the Ari Burnu area was precisely what Hamilton hoped

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296 This includes the remnants of the 2/27 battalion originally defending the beaches
would happen. It might be argued that committing almost all available reserves to the Ari Burnu front was a great mistake on Kemal’s part in that it was what his opponents wanted. Such a view is mistaken. While Hamilton hoped the ANZAC Corps would attract the Ottoman reserve he did not wish the Corps to be destroyed though he knew this was a possibility. Kemal took the opportunity to throw as great a force as he could muster at the ANZAC Corps on the grounds that should he destroy it, he would then be able to turn against the British 29th Division at Cape Helles. The loss of half of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (the ANZAC Corps) would doom the remainder regardless of how far the 29th Division had advanced from Cape Helles.

TERRAIN AND TACTICAL SITUATION

As has been noted many Ottoman officers were familiar with the terrain. The Ottoman 9th and 19th Divisions had exercised there many times in the previous month. Indeed, the Ottoman 27th Regiment had just returned from a night exercise at Gaba Tepe when called upon to respond to the ANZAC Corps landing. Few of the ANZAC Corps officers had set eyes on the terrain and those who had had done so only from the sea.

There are four terrain features to be considered in order to decide whom the terrain favoured. Working from the Ottoman right flank to the left, Sari Bair is the dominating feature and a commander placing himself there, as Mustapha Kemal did, can see immediately much of what he needs to know. From this height rifle, machine gun and artillery fire can be directed on the entire ANZAC front with the exception of the Nek, which is hidden by the mound of Baby 700, and the far flank, which is out of machine gun and rifle but not artillery range. The seaward side of the Sari Bair massif is precipitous in most places down to and including the Razorback. This served two purposes. First each side was able to rest a flank on this steep slope. More importantly the half of the Third Brigade that landed north of Ari Burnu would have found this obstacle confronting them. It is the view of these men, recorded in letters and reminiscences, that has given rise to the popular image of the

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297 Kinross, *Ataturk* p 56
troops landing and having to scale a cliff. For those landing south of the point the terrain is steep but climbable everywhere. This terrain feature also serves to slow any reinforcements making for Baby 700 for they must go around two sides of a triangle instead of straight from the beach to Baby 700.

Secondly, there is First Ridge, an extension of Sari Bair rising from Ari Burnu itself to the Nek via Plugges Plateau, Razor Edge and Russell’s Top. It was not possible to move troops in any number along it not only because of fire from Sari Bair but also because of the nature of the ridge itself. The Razor Edge–from Plugge’s to Russell’s Top – is so narrow as to be unsuitable for formed bodies of troops to move along its crest. Thus troops wishing to move to support the ANZAC left have to wind up Shrapnel Gully into Monash Gully then and climb its steep sides at one of several point of access. Ottoman troops wishing to approach this flank find much easier approaches. The confusion of gullies leading off from Shrapnel Gully caused many troops sent to prop up the ANZAC left to fail to reach the desired point.

Looking now to the centre and the left from the Ottoman perspective the third terrain feature is really two- Second and Third Ridges that are roughly parallel. The Third ridge allowed Ottoman artillery to sit just beyond its crest and shell second ridge with impunity, as well as allowing a covered approach for to their centre. The Ottoman 72nd Regiment availed themselves of this in their attack upon the centre late in the day. The Second Ridge was of similar utility to the ANZAC Corps except not all approaches to its rear were unobserved from Sari Bair.

On the Ottoman extreme left the fourth important terrain feature was Gaba Tepe, held by the defenders throughout the day and the whole campaign. Gaba Tepe stood as a bastion behind the ANZAC right flank and guns there were able to bombard the anchorage and slow the landing.

Against the defenders knowledge of the terrain and the attackers difficulty in deploying in it must be set the tactical situation. In the morning the terrain acted to slow the ANZAC Corps deployment and provide cover for the defenders. In the afternoon the ANZAC Corps had 7-8000 rifles deployed on a front of not much
more than a man per metre, over twice as long as the doctrine of the time recommended. On the other hand it held a ridge along its front. This was to its advantage. Towards the ANZAC left this ridge was overlooked by the spine of Sari Bair, rising inland from it to the northeast. This feature marked the weakest part of the position at Baby 700 and explains why this hill was the main Ottoman objective and why it was so difficult to hold.

The terrain in short contributed to placing the ANZAC Corps in a perilous situation in the morning but, as they were defending in the afternoon, it served to their advantage.

MORALE

The Ottoman soldiers were drawn from all corners of their Empire and many cannot any more than the Australians be said to have been defending ‘the ashes of their fathers nor the temples of their gods.’ The former had the admittedly not heartening experience of the First and Second Balkan Wars although morale was aided by a signal victory at the end of the war when the fortress of Adrianople was retaken. Nevertheless the Ottoman army did not perform well then and this is often remarked upon. What is not usually mentioned at the same time is that it was outnumbered by two and a half to one and in a most unfavourable strategic situation. Much of the criticism of the Ottoman forces in the Balkan Wars is misplaced as it performed quite well in the Second Balkan War when its strategic situation was much improved and it was opposed only by a Bulgarian Army of comparable size.

If casualties inflicted on a unit that is still in the line at the end of the day are any guide then the Ottoman 57th and 27th Regiments had high morale as both sustained 50% killed and wounded on the day.298 Against this a battalion of 77th Regiment is said to have panicked and fled in the early evening. The 77th and 72nd Regiments were not Turkish regiments being mainly composed of Arabs. Ottoman sources rarely neglect an opportunity to suggest these regiments had not the morale of

298 Bean, Gallipoli Mission p 351
Turkish regiments. No difference in morale among the Ottoman units is noted by any English language sources.

In the case of the ANZAC Corps no such morale distinction among units can be made mainly because there is no evidence to suggest if any battalion or brigade contributed more or less to the crowd of soldiers who were observed leaving the line some of whom filtered down to the beach. It is often held that the morale of volunteers is greater than that of conscripts, though there are many examples from history that do not support this. The Corps as a whole did have a morale problem later in the day though whether this was greater than that of the enemy cannot be determined.

**ASSESSMENT**

In three of the ten headings used to assess combat effectiveness the ANZAC Corps held the advantage but it is important to qualify this by pointing out the first two are dependent upon the third, so strong is the terrain advantage conferred on the defender in modern war. When two sides are roughly even in infantry and machine gun strength and no other factor supervenes, the defender, provided he has some useful terrain advantage, will always prevail. Regarding morale the present writer is not able to make a judgement other than to say morale was equally high on both sides.

The great strength of the Ottoman artillery easily offset any advantage received from naval gunfire support and in the remaining four areas the Ottoman force had a clear edge. It seems reasonable then to claim the Ottoman force at Ari Burnu was a more powerful military instrument than the ANZAC Corps. This superiority was not however of quite sufficient scale to enable them to drive the Corps into the sea on 25 April.

One who has made a serious study of the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire said, “taken as a whole...the army at Gallipoli may justly be considered to have been the
finest that has ever taken the field in the history of the Turkish empire” 300. And Hamilton speaks for the prevailing view among the attackers when he said: “I did not know, to tell you the truth, that the Turks were nearly as good as they turned out to be” 301.

299 The Army of Frederick the Great, on which all European armies modeled themselves for half a century, was a conscript force. So too was that of Napoleon.
300 Murphy, Soldiers of the Prophet p142
301 Bush, Gallipoli p 153
CHAPTER SIX. CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

The analysis of battles long after they have occurred is not an easy task. The Duke of Wellington said it was as easy as giving an account of a ball. One may know to whom one spoke and with whom one danced but none can give a full account of events. In The Thin Red Line, James Jones notes an additional problem claiming that none of those who were there will remember it that way when they read a description. Regretfully this will not be a problem for the present writer for the last of those present on both sides on 25 April 1915 have recently passed away.

The intent of this thesis was not to investigate all aspects of the landing. Sinclair-Maclagans decision not to continue with an attack on Gaba Tepe nor the question hanging over the failure of the Corps to land more artillery nor the controversy over the lack of facilities for the wounded are not dealt with.

I have rather been guided by the reasons that prompted Bean to write Gallipoli Mission almost thirty years after the campaign and over twenty years since the appearance of his official history. A series of questions and unresolved issues had built up in the interim and he wished to address them. As the events of the landing have been well plundered by writers of military history I have been surprised at how many facts, hardened by time, are open to question particularly when Ottoman, Turkish, French and German sources are scrutinized and compared with English language sources.

What has been learned can be divided into points the present writer regards as reasonably well established by this thesis and others that most definitely merit further investigation. Of the former there are five: As asserted in the introduction, the landing of the ANZAC Corps on the Gallipoli peninsula on 25 April 1915 failed because it was designed to fail. Apart from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force general order issued to its subordinate units a close study of the documents reveals the orders to be couched in cautious terms strongly suggesting the awareness the Corps would, and was designed to, do battle with the Ottoman reserve. There exists
strong evidence the location for the landing was chosen with this in mind. Moreover senior officers of the ANZAC Corps issued progressively more cautious orders to their subordinates suggesting an awareness of the extremely difficult and dangerous task the corps had been set. The defenders of the peninsula had, and have always had, a clearer view of this: "We imagined the tactics of the ANZAC landing to be as follows.... by drawing more troops to ANZAC the task at Sedd el Bahr (Cape Helles) would be more easily effected" 302.

Secondly it is only necessary to compare the maps used by the ANZAC Corps with the ground itself and maps drawn up by the 5th Ottoman Army to see they are tolerably good as regards terrain and with one notable exception accurately mark the defenders dispositions. The location and strength of the enemy was well known to all concerned in planning the landing.

Thirdly the focus on the confusion of the first landed infantry has diverted attention from the real cause of the disarray into which the Corps fell, the response of a well deployed, well prepared, well commanded and numerically strong enemy. The Corps was not as badly affected by the particular circumstances of its disembarkation as it was by the battle on Second Ridge. This, not the landing, should be the focal point of the events of the day.

Fourthly it was to the advantage of the Corps that its senior officer present at the first landing, Sinclair-Maclagan, realized the dangers of continuing to advance and responded accordingly. As it was the ANZAC Corps managed just to fight off the main Ottoman counterattack, having had several hours in position, albeit under bombardment, to prepare. How much worse might have been the outcome of the day had the 2nd Brigade pressed on towards Third Ridge or along Sari Bair can be easily imagined.

Fifthly an assessment of the relative combat effectiveness of the rivals reveals the defenders of the peninsula, naval gunfire support notwithstanding, to have been the stronger of the two. On the way to this it has been shown that ANZAC Corps

302 Bean Gallipoli Mission p353
casualties were much higher than had previously been believed. The Ottoman force present was a regular one with a powerful artillery component and a gifted leader. The ANZAC Corps in contrast was a completely untried force. Sir Ian Hamilton did what it is correct to do with such soldiers. He used them as a feint. It is a normal thing for generals to use the tried and tested regular troops, in this case the 29th Division that landed at Cape Helles, for the main attack. A force that will impress the enemy with its size but may prove brittle is entirely suitable and economical as a diversion and will serve as well to keep the enemy reserve busy for the day of the landings.

A similar study in combat effectiveness for the main landing at Cape Helles is warranted. There the power of the attackers will probably be found to be stronger than that of the defenders but the immediate defences at some of the beaches presented a far more severe trial and this may be found to be of overwhelming importance.

Less well established are three more propositions: First that the landing did not occur where it was intended. There is still work to be done here for although Howe who first raised the idea that a last minute change was made has recanted he has shown all has not yet been clarified. And if Howe is wrong there remains to be explained the exact reason why the landing did not occur where intended. Winter has raised the last minute change of plan idea again comparatively recently but cannot show any documentary evidence nor explain why Thursby, Birdwood, Bridges and Godley never afterwards referred to it. Should this issue ever be resolved it is most likely the answer will be found at least in part, as Steel and Hart have proposed, in the drifting of *HMS Queen*, the marking ship, from her correct position. Bush and Howe have also pointed out that no investigation was done into what blame ought be borne by the Royal Navy for its part. The present writer can add to this by observing that, such are the difficulties of seamanship, it would perhaps have been more surprising had the force been landed precisely where intended.

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303 One only has to follow the career of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) in the war against Greece (1920-22) to see he was a military commander of some ability.
It is odd in a way that there has been such a fuss over the point at which the Corps landed. The explosion of amphibious warfare in the Second World War has obscured the fact that opposed landings of large forces for more than raiding purposes were, until then, extremely rare in warfare. General Godley who commanded the New Zealand and Australian Division was right when he wrote: “So far as I know, no army in the world has ever before been called upon to undertake such an operation as landing on an open beach in the face of a numerous and powerful enemy, amply supplied with artillery, machine guns and ammunition.... and with lines of entrenchments which make the whole peninsula a veritable fortress”. 304

There are only two similar such large opposed landings on record before 1915: that of 55 BC when Julius Caesar invaded Britain and had to fight his way ashore and Aboukir Bay in Egypt in 1801 where a British army landed on beaches under considerable fire from French defenders. 305 In 1907 General Hamley in The Operations of War was given the generally accepted view of the time when he stated “In face of serious opposition a landing is almost an impossibility, and a force heavily attacked while landing, even if part is already ashore, will be in a precarious situation”. 306 This is an apt description of the perilous circumstances of the ANZAC Corps on the 25 April 1915.

Amphibious assaults in the Second World War were also quite likely to land their troops in the wrong location even when conducted in daylight. Of sixteen amphibious assaults in WWII, of equal or larger size than that at Gallipoli, half landed at least some of their troops in the wrong place. Utah and Omaha beach in the Normandy landings and Salerno in Italy are such examples. The Salerno landing was about the same size as the Gallipoli landing. The Normandy landings were thrice the size taking vehicles into consideration. Even at Balikpapan, with three years of experience in amphibious landings in the

304. King College, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives CAB 19/29/52
305. Birdwood had visited the site of the Aboukir Bay landing while in Egypt
306. Hamley, The Operations of War, p352
Pacific behind them the Americans and Australians landed a part of the amphibious force on the wrong beach.

The second of the less certain propositions is that the number of artillery pieces arrayed against the landing was much greater than has previously been believed. This is less certain not because it is not a fact but rather because the writer has not been able to view all the evidence. Documents exist in the Genelkurmay Arşivi in Ankara which would clarify this point.

Thirdly, the casualties suffered on the first day were considerably greater than has been accepted and most likely the Ottoman artillery inflicted the major portion of them. Again the lesser degree of certainty arises not because we should be unsure about the casualties but rather because it cannot be shown with certainty the majority of casualties were caused by Ottoman artillery.

The ANZAC Corps did fulfil its objective on 25 April by pinning the Ottoman Reserve so it could not intervene in the main attack at Cape Helles. Of nineteen defending infantry battalions, four did not fight. Of the remaining fifteen, eleven were committed against the Corps and four against the British 29th Division. Sinclair-Maclagan observed that it is often necessary to sacrifice the rook in order to win the game. In this case the rook was displayed, the bait taken but the queen failed to complete the victory.
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MAPS

Map One-Ottoman deployment on 25 April 1915. From Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations, Gallipoli

Map Two-locality names used in text. From Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations, Gallipoli

Map Three- ANZAC Corps front, 0430 to 0900

Map shows initial dispositions of Ottoman Artillery

Note 1. First wave of ANZAC Corps
2. Second wave
3. Intended landing site
4. All subsequent arrivals landed here
5. Ottoman battery captured on 400 Plateau
6. 150mm Howitzer battery on Palamutluk Ridge
7. Camburnu Battery
8. One battery with 57th regiment went with it to Sari Bair and the other went later, probably by a more direct route.

Map Four-ANZAC Corps front, 0900 to 2000

Map shows final positions of Ottoman Artillery

Note 1. 72nd Regiment sent two battalions to attack between 57th and 27th Regiments. One battalion supported 7th Regiment. Supporting artillery probably deployed as shown.
2. The artillery concentration here is the two batteries in support of 27th regiment and a single piece surviving from the battery captured on 400 Plateau.
3. These two batteries marched with 77th Regiment, deployed with it on Palamutluk Ridge then advanced to Third Ridge to support its attack on the ANZAC extreme right.
TURKISH DISPOSITIONS BEFORE THE LANDINGS

NOTE

Fifth Army
H.Q.

Divisions 5 019.

Bulair Lines

SCALE OF MILES