Charles Darwin University

CDU eSpace
Institutional Repository

 
CDU Staff and Student only
 

Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties.

Ford, Sharon (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties.. Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics,13(2):195-215.

Document type: Journal Article
Citation counts:
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Attached Files (Some files may be inaccessible until you login with your CDU eSpace credentials)
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
Download this reading Ford_60126.pdf Accepted version application/pdf 190.58KB 5
Reading the attached file works best in Firefox, Chrome and IE 9 or later.

Title Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties.
Author Ford, Sharon
Journal Name Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics
Publication Date 2012
Volume Number 13
Issue Number 2
ISSN 1437-2053   (check CDU catalogue  open catalogue search in new window)
eISSN 1874-6373
Start Page 195
End Page 215
Total Pages 20
Place of Publication Germany
Publisher Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Language English
Field of Research 220309 - Metaphysics
220206 - History and Philosophy of Science (incl. Non-historical Philosophy of Science)
Abstract Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the Causal Theory of Properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be deemed genuine rather than ‘mere-Cambridge’. The intrinsic criterion requires that all genuine properties and relations be intrinsic. Molnar’s S-property argument says that these criteria conflict if one considers extrinsic spatiotemporal properties and relations to contribute causally. In this paper I argue that a solution to the contradiction that Molnar identifies involves a denial of discreteness between objects, leading to a Power Holist perspective and a resulting deflationary account of intrinsicality.
Keywords Sydney Shoemaker
George Molnar
Holism
criteria for properties
genuine properties
causal theory of properties
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0104-z   (check subscription with CDU E-Gateway service for CDU Staff and Students  check subscription with CDU E-Gateway in new window)


© copyright

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in CDU eSpace. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact digitisation@cdu.edu.au.

 
Versions
Version Filter Type
Access Statistics: 16 Abstract Views, 6 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Tue, 24 Jan 2017, 18:15:57 CST by Sharon Ford